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RETHINKING DISCRIMINATION LAW
Sandra F. Sperino*
Modem employment discrimination law is defined by an increasingly com-
plex set of frameworks. These frameworks structure the ways that courts,
juries, and litigants think about discrimination. This Article challenges
whether courts should use the frameworks to conceptualize discrimination.
It argues that just as faulty sorting contributes to stereotyping and societal
discrimination, courts are using faulty structures to substantively limit dis-
crimination claims.
This Article makes three central contributions. First, it demonstrates how
discrimination analysis has been reduced to a rote sorting process. It rec-
ognizes and makes explicit courts' methodology so that the structure of
discrimination analysis and its effects can be examined. Second, it demon-
strates how the frameworks tend to squeeze out claims that are arguably
cognizable under the federal discrimination statutes' broad operative lan-
guage. This Article's final contribution is to propose a simpler model for
thinking about employment discrimination law. It argues for a return to
first principles that would require courts to specifically define key statutory
language.
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INTRODUCTION
In the 1970s, federal courts began identifying categories of discrimina-
tion, such as disparate impact, disparate treatment, and harassment. They
then created elaborate, multipart rubrics tied to each category.' Modem em-
ployment discrimination law is defined by these frameworks. They serve as
gatekeepers that control the substantive discrimination narratives that juries
hear and also structure the ways that judges and lawyers think about dis-
crimination.
Legal scholarship is replete with excellent articles challenging the spe-
cific frameworks that courts use to evaluate discrimination claims.2 This
Article does not challenge any particular framework. Instead, it challenges
whether courts should even use frameworks to conceptualize discrimination
in the first place. Just as faulty sorting contributes to stereotyping and socie-
tal discrimination, courts are using faulty structures to substantively limit
discrimination claims.
1. This Article uses the term "framework" to refer to the two-step process that courts
use to funnel discrimination claims, in which courts label the category of discrimination and
then apply the appropriate rubric. This term is used to avoid the confusion that might other-
wise be created by using terms such as "claim" or "elements," which have more specific
meanings in civil procedure. As explained in more detail in Section IV.B, there is rampant
procedural confusion regarding whether the discrimination categories represent separate
claims and whether the rubrics are elements of those claims.
2. See, e.g., William R. Corbett, Babbling About Employment Discrimination Law:
Does the Master Builder Understand the Blueprint for the Great Tower?, 12 U. PA. J. Bus. L.
683 (2010); William R. Corbett, Fixing Employment Discrimination Law, 62 SMU L. REv. 81
(2009); Martin J. Katz, Gross Disunity, 114 PENN ST. L. REv. 857 (2010) [hereinafter Katz,
Gross Disunity]; Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93
MICH. L. REV. 2229 (1995); Natasha T. Martin, Pretext in Peril, 75 Mo. L. REv. 313 (2010);
Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact: Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage, 47 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 911 (2005); Michael J. Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law: Price Water-
house Is Dead, Whither McDonnell Douglas?, 53 EMORY L.J. 1887 (2004); Michael J.
Zimmer, Slicing & Dicing of Individual Disparate Treatment Law, 61 LA. L. REv. 577 (2001).
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The Article makes three central contributions. First, it demonstrates how
discrimination analysis has been reduced to a rote sorting process. It recog-
nizes and makes explicit courts' methodology so that the structure of
discrimination analysis and its effects can be examined.
Second, it demonstrates how these frameworks tend to squeeze out
claims that are arguably cognizable under the federal discrimination stat-
utes' broad operative language. This happens because the categories and
rubrics that comprise the frameworks are overly influenced by the facts and
theories of the specific cases through which they were developed and are
resistant to change. Additionally, courts tend to treat the typology of frame-
works as representing a complete lens through which to view discrimination
and fail to consider the frameworks as part of a unified whole. This reason-
ing produces a factually and theoretically narrow view of employment
discrimination law driven by path dependence.
Litigating by typology results in a gap between what is cognizable under
the frameworks and what is arguably cognizable under the federal discrimi-
nation statutes' operative provisions. Thus, the key question in modem
discrimination cases is often whether the plaintiff can cram his or her facts
into a recognized structure and not whether the facts establish discrimina-
tion. This Article argues that path-depentent reasoning has allowed courts to
implicitly reject new theories of discrimination, without actually analyzing
whether such theories are viable. Path-dependent reasoning also causes
courts to dismiss claims that straddle more than one framework or that do not
fit neatly within recognized structures. The typology has led to doctrinal, pro-
cedural, and theoretical confusion within employment discrimination law and
has mired the field in endless questions about frameworks rather than in ad-
dressing the field's core issues.
These frameworks have effects outside the courtroom. More than forty
years after the passage of Title VII, workers continue to experience discrim-
ination.3 When workers describe this discrimination, though, they often
report incidents that would not be legally cognizable under current frame-
works but that are arguably discriminatory within the statutory language.4
When employers define and measure discrimination in a workplace, they
are likely to do so against the yardstick set by the recognized frameworks.
3. See, e.g., Title VI! of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Charges, U.S. EQUAL EMP'T OP-
PORTUNITY COMM'N, http://eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/titlevii.cfm (last visited May
8, 2011) (noting 68,710 charges of discrimination filed in fiscal year 2009, compared with
58,615 in fiscal year 1997); Devah Pager & Hana Shepherd, The Sociology of Discrimination:
Racial Discrimination in Employment, Housing, Credit, and Consumer Markets, 34 ANN.
REV. SOC. 181, 182-83 (2008) (describing research regarding perceptions of discrimination).
4. See, e.g., CATALYST, BIT BY BIT: CATALYST's GUIDE TO ADVANCING WOMEN IN HIGH
TECH COMPANIES 8 (2003), available at http://www.catalyst.org/file7/bit (reporting that women
indicated their underrepresentation in high-tech companies was due to exclusionary corporate
cultures and they felt a sense of isolation resulting from a lack of role models, networks, and
mentors); NETWORK OF EXEC. WOMEN, WOMEN OF COLOR: THE CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNI-
TY AHEAD (2006), available at http://www.newnewsletter.org/bestpractices/newreport2-
wocO4O7.pdf (indicating that women of color feel doubly isolated, lack mentors, and are dis-
couraged from seeking promotions because they witness the lack of advancement of others).
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Because this legal yardstick does not measure the full extent of potentially
cognizable discrimination, however, it is a poor metric for evaluating wheth-
er discrimination occurs.
The Article's final contribution is to propose a simpler model for think-
ing about employment discrimination law. It argues for a return to first
principles that would require courts to specifically define key statutory lan-
guage.
The Article is organized in the following manner. Part I describes how
courts developed the frameworks for evaluating discrimination claims and
shows how the frameworks remain unresponsive to changes in the work-
place and discrimination theory. Part II provides examples of how the
frameworks distort discrimination inquiries, and Part III explores why the
frameworks cause courts to ignore potentially cognizable claims. Part IV
considers other serious consequences that result from relying on the frame-
works. Finally, Part V proposes a way to think about discrimination law
without dependence on the frameworks.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DISCRIMINATION FRAMEWORKS
The history of employment discrimination law could be described as a
history of frameworks. In an almost predictable pattern, the Supreme Court
has recognized a category of employment discrimination, and then--either
in the same case or sometime thereafter-created a multipart test for evalu-
ating it. For some frameworks, decades of unrest then follow as lower courts
struggle with either the rubric itself or with integrating the rubric into other
parts of employment discrimination law. The Supreme Court often has-and
Congress occasionally has-stepped in to "fix" the framework.
This pattern did not always exist. In the 1960s, the bulk of employment
discrimination claims alleged that employers (or unions) had adopted ex-
plicit policies regarding hiring, termination, or promotion based on a
person's race or gender.5 Courts evaluated such claims in a fairly straight-
5. See, e.g., Vogler v. McCarty, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 368, 374 (E.D. La. 1968) (alleging
that employer engaged in discrimination by hiring only union members, when union itself
engaged in discriminatory membership practices), aff'd sub nom. Vogler v. Local 53 of the
Int'l Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators & Asbestos Workers, 407 F2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969);
Weeks v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 277 F. Supp. 117, 117-18 (S.D. Ga. 1967) (alleging that
employer had a policy of making gender a qualification for a switchman position), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969); Cooper v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 274 F Supp.
781, 781 (E.D. La. 1967) (alleging discrimination based on company policy that required
women to resign upon marriage); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 272 F. Supp. 332, 336 (S.D.
Ind. 1967) (alleging that company's use of male and female layoff lists was discriminatory),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 416 F2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969); Evenson v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 268 F.
Supp. 29, 30 (E.D. Va. 1967) (alleging discrimination based on company policy that required
women to resign upon marriage); Int'l Chem. Workers Union v. Planters Mfg. Co., 259 F
Supp. 365, 366 n.I (N.D. Miss. 1966) (alleging that company did not include "Negro employ-
ees in the top operating classifications" and that it maintained discriminatory wage rates and
discriminated in overtime pay and allowance of vacation time); United States v. Bldg. & Con-
str. Trades Council, 271 F. Supp. 447, 450 (E.D. Mo. 1966) (alleging that unions had policy
discriminating against people based on race); Glover v. St. Louis-S.F R.R. Co., No. CA 65-
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forward way: they required the plaintiff to establish that her employer took
the alleged action because of a protected trait.6 As courts began to divide
discrimination law into categories, however, this broader approach to em-
ployment discrimination changed.'
This Part describes the development of the current employment discrim-
ination typology from two perspectives. The first Section maps the
discrimination model as it developed, largely through Supreme Court prece-
dent. The second Section juxtaposes the development of the model with
changes in the workplace and evolving understandings about how discrimi-
nation occurs.
While reading this history, it is important to remember that each of the
discrimination frameworks was originally developed in the context of Title
VII and was, in theory, supposed to support Title VII's primary operative
language, which provides as follows:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such indi-
vidual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual
of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as
an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.'
Although not identical, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
("ADEA") and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") have similarly
broad operative language. 9
477, 1966 WL 68, at *1 (N.D. Ala. July 13, 1966) (alleging that employer and union main-
tained a discriminatory seniority roster), aff'd sub nom. Glover v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry. Co., 386
F.2d 452 (5th Cir. 1967), rev'd, 393 U.S. 324 (1969); Hall v. Werthan Bag Corp., 251 F. Supp.
184, 188 (M.D. Tenn. 1966) (alleging that employer maintained a segregated job structure).
6. See, e.g., Washington v. Safeway Corp., 467 F.2d 945, 948 n.6 (10th Cir. 1972)
(indicating that the plaintiff had not shown that he had been discriminated against in the terms
and conditions of his employment on the basis of his race); Green v. McDonnell-Douglas
Corp., 318 F. Supp. 846, 850 (E.D. Mo. 1970) (noting that the issue before the court was
whether employer's refusal to rehire was based on racial prejudice), rev'd on other grounds,
463 F.2d 337 (8th Cir. 1972), vacated, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
7. A plaintiff may also allege retaliation, failure to accommodate (religion and disabil-
ity), or that the employer engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination. Each of these also
has separate proof structures. See, e.g., US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 400-401
(2002) (providing framework for disability accommodation); Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977) (providing basic framework for pattern or practice claims);
Reed v. UAW, 569 F.3d 576, 579-80 (6th Cir. 2009) (discussing religious accommodation
framework).
8. Title VII § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006).
9. The ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer to "fail or refuse to hire or to dis-
charge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his
October 20111
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A. The Legal History of the Discrimination Frameworks
The legal history of the employment discrimination frameworks can be
shown through the development of the disparate impact, individual disparate
treatment, and harassment doctrines. In 1971, the Supreme Court interpreted
Title VII to allow plaintiffs to assert discrimination based on disparate im-
pact,10 reasoning that Title VII prohibited not only intentional conduct, but
policies and practices that created "built-in headwinds" to the hiring of
black employees.' Thus, the Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. articulated
a reason for recognizing a category of discrimination called "disparate im-
pact" and began to develop a rudimentary structure for evaluating it.'2 The
Court indicated that the defendant company's testing and high school di-
ploma requirements were discriminatory, for example, because they did not
"bear a demonstrable relationship to successful performance of the jobs."'3
Four years later, in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,'4 the Court suggested
that disparate impact claims would follow a three-part burden-shifting struc-
ture, similar to the test announced in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
and enunciated a more complete test for evaluating disparate impact cases. 5
Almost fifteen years later, the Court modified the disparate impact test in
two cases, Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust 6 and Wards Cove Packing
Co. v. Atonio.'7 In Watson, the Court (in a portion of the opinion joined by a
plurality) indicated that to prove a disparate impact the plaintiff needed to
identify "the specific employment practice that is challenged" and needed to
establish statistical evidence of a kind and degree sufficient to show that the
practice disparately affected a protected class.' 8 The burden of production
then shifted to the defendant to show that "its employment practices are
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
age" or to "limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend
to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status
as an employee, because of such individual's age." Age Discrimination in Employment Act
§ 4(a), 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2006). The ADA prohibits discrimination "against a qualified indi-
vidual [on the basis of disability] in regard to job application procedures, the hiring,
advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other
terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." Americans with Disabilities Act § 102(a),
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2006). It then further defines discrimination in a separate subsection,
containing seven separate definitional categories. Id. § 102(b), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b).
10. Griggs v. Duke Power Co,, 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
11. Id. at 432 (internal quotation marks omitted).
12. Id. at431.
13. Id.
14. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
15. Compare Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 425, with McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801-03 (1973).
16. 487 U.S. 977 (1988) (plurality opinion), superseded in part by statute, Civil Rights
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074.
17. 490 U.S. 642 (1989), superseded in part by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub.
L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074.
18. Watson, 487 U.S. at 994.
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based on legitimate business reasons."19 Once the defendant meets this bur-
den, the plaintiff can prevail by showing that the defendant could have used
other tests that would not have created the same disparity.20 A year later, in
Wards Cove, a five-justice majority largely reaffirmed the Watson plurality's
interpretation of the requirements for proving disparate impact.21
Unhappy with this Court-created structure, Congress amended Title VII
in 1991.22 The 1991 amendments imported the concept of a "specific em-
ployment practice" from the case law, but also allowed a plaintiff to
challenge combined practices that created a disparate impact if the plaintiff
was unable to separate the practices.23 Under the amendments, it is the em-
ployer's burden to establish that a practice is "job related for the position in
question and consistent with business necessity;" even if the defendant es-
tablishes this affirmative defense, however, the plaintiff. may prevail by
proving that the employer could have adopted alternate practices that would
not have resulted in a disparate impact.24
When Congress amended Title VII, it did not make similar changes to
the ADEA or the ADA.25 In 2005, the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs
could bring disparate impact claims under the ADEA. 26 Unsurprisingly, the
Court also began to develop a framework for evaluating ADEA disparate
impact claims.27 The first step in the analysis is the same as the analysis for
Title VII claims prior to the 1991 amendments, in that the plaintiff must
demonstrate that a specific practice created a disparate impact based on the
protected trait. However, the second step differs in that the employer must
establish that the challenged practice was based on a reasonable factor other
than age.28 The disparate impact inquiry under the ADEA now proceeds in a
different manner than the analogous inquiry under Title VII. The employee
may not prevail on an ADEA disparate impact claim by establishing the
existence of alternative practices.2 9 The Supreme Court has not yet resolved
how disparate impact claims would proceed under the ADA.
The history of individual disparate treatment is even more complex than
that of disparate impact, but it too is characterized by reliance on frame-
works. During the 1960s, plaintiffs often claimed that employers were
19. Id. at 998.
20. Id.
21. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 656-57.
22. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, sec. 105, § 703, 105 Stat. 1071,
1074 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2006)).
23. See id. (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)).
24. See id. (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(i)).
25. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005).
26. Id. at 236-38 (plurality opinion).
27. See id. at 240-42 (majority opinion).
28. See Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 554 U.S. 84 (2008) (clarifying that
employer's burden at the second step is one of both production and persuasion); Smith, 544
U.S. at 240.
29. Smith, 544 U.S. at 243.
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making explicit race- or gender-based decisions according to company poli-
cies.3" Courts later grouped claims of facially discriminatory policies into a
type of individual disparate treatment case referred to as a "direct evidence
case."'" The courts tended to use simple formulations in evaluating direct
evidence cases, essentially requiring plaintiffs to establish that a decision
was taken because of a protected trait.32
During the 1970s, the types of discrimination cases that federal courts
heard began to change. While plaintiffs still brought numerous claims
against employers and unions for facially discriminatory policies,33 plaintiffs
increasingly alleged non-policy-based discrimination.34  In McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, the Supreme Court created a three-part burden-
shifting test for analyzing individual disparate treatment cases.35 Under
McDonnell Douglas, a court first evaluates the prima facie case, which re-
quires proof of the following:
30. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
31. See, e.g., Stone v. Autoliv ASP, Inc., 210 F.3d 1132, 1136-37 (10th Cir. 2000) (indi-
cating that a company policy of discrimination constitutes direct evidence). Outside of the
context of facially discriminatory policies, courts have had difficulty defining direct evidence.
And definitions regarding what constitutes direct evidence vary. While the definition of "direct
evidence" appears to vary by circuit, direct evidence of discrimination can be described as
"evidence, that, if believed, proves the existence of a fact in issue without inference or pre-
sumption .... [and] is composed of only the most blatant remarks, whose intent could be
nothing other than to discriminate on the basis of some impermissible factor." Rojas v. Florida,
285 F.3d 1339, 1342 n.2 (11 th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted) (quoting Schoenfeld v. Babbitt,
168 F.3d 1257, 1266 (11 th Cir. 1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted). One court described
direct evidence as evidence that "essentially requires an admission by the employer" and ex-
plained that "such evidence is rare." Argyropoulos v. City of Alton, 539 F.3d 724, 733 (7th Cir.
2008) (quoting Benders v. Bellows & Bellows, 515 F.3d 757, 764 (7th Cir. 2008)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). "A statement that can plausibly be interpreted two different ways-
one discriminatory and the other benign--does not directly reflect illegal animus, and, thus,
does not constitute direct evidence." Vaughn v. Epworth Villa, 537 F.3d 1147, 1154-55 (10th
Cir. 2008) (quoting Hall v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, Admin. Review Bd., 476 F.3d 847, 855 (10th
Cir. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
32. See, e.g., Mach v. Will Cnty. Sheriff, 580 F.3d 495, 499 (7th Cir. 2009); Paz v.
Wauconda Healthcare & Rehab. Ctr., L.L.C., 464 F.3d 659, 665-66 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting
that under the direct method of proving discrimination, the court should not use a burden-
shifting framework).
33. See, e.g., Healen v. E. Airlines, Inc., No. 18097, 1973 WL 358, at *1 (N.D. Ga.
Sept. 10, 1973) (alleging discriminatory policy affecting pregnant flight attendants).
34. See, e.g., Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 556 n.* (D.N.J.
1976) ("If a supervisor is acting within the purview of his authority, the doctrine of respondeat
superior may be employed whether he is driving a company car or victimizing a female."),
rev'd, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); Slack v. Havens, No. 72-59-GT, 1973 WL 339, at *5
(S.D. Cal. May 15, 1973) (indicating that Title VII imputes liability for the actions of agents
and that management had ratified the conduct of the supervisor), aff'd, 522 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir.
1975); Tidwell v. Am. Oil Co., 332 F. Supp. 424, 436 (D. Utah 1971) (holding employer liable
when a supervisor terminated an individual based on race).
35. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Some circuits will allow a plaintiff to make a case of discrim-
ination without resorting to McDonnell Douglas if the plaintiff has "either direct or
circumstantial evidence that supports an inference of intentional discrimination." Coffman v.
Indianapolis Fire Dep't, 578 F.3d 559, 563 (7th Cir. 2009).
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(i) that [the plaintiff] belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and
was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants;
(iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his
rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek
applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.36
If the prima facie case is satisfied, the burden then shifts to the employer "to
articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's re-
jection."37 If the defendant meets this requirement, the plaintiff can still pre-
prevail by demonstrating that the defendant's reason for the rejection was
simply a pretext.38
In McDonnell Douglas itself, the Court noted that the facts required to
prove a prima facie case will necessarily vary among cases.3 9 As the lower
courts began applying McDonnell Douglas to different factual scenarios,
they began to develop different iterations of the test, following its basic
three-part burden-shifting structure while substituting different language
within the prima facie case.
After McDonnell Douglas, significant confusion surrounded McDonnell
Douglas's three-part burden-shifting test, including questions regarding the
defendant's burden at the second step in the inquiry and the effect of a plain-
tiff's showing of pretext. Two subsequent cases clarified (and some would
say altered) how the McDonnell Douglas test operates.40 In Texas Depart-
ment of Community Affairs v. Burdine, the Court explained that the
defendant's burden at the second step in the McDonnell Douglas framework
is a burden only of production. 4' The Court held that the "ultimate burden of
persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated
against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff."42 In St. Mary's
Honor Center v. Hicks, the Court considered whether the factfinder's rejec-
tion of the defendant employer's asserted reason for its action mandated a
finding for the plaintiff.43 The Supreme Court held that while the factfinder's
rejection of the employer's proffered reason permits the factfinder to infer
discrimination, it does not compel such a finding.44
The McDonnell Douglas test's focus on the employer's nondiscrimina-
tory reason for its action implicitly suggested that discrimination claims
might only be cognizable if the plaintiff alleges that the employer acted
solely because of a discriminatory reason. In the 1989 case Price Water-
house v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court interpreted Title VII to allow
36. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 804.
39. Id. at 802 n.13.
40. See Malamud, supra note 2, at 2311.
41. 450 U.S. 248, 254-56 (1981).
42. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
43. 509 U.S. 502, 508-09 (1993).
44. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 510-11.
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so-called "mixed-motive" claims.45 Once again, it produced yet another test.
The Court held that a plaintiff must establish that a protected trait played a
motivating factor in the employment decision.4 6 The employer can avoid
liability by proving an affirmative defense-that it would have made the
same decision even if it had not allowed the protected trait to play a role.47
While the justices agreed on many of the central contours of mixed motive,
they did not agree on whether a plaintiff must present direct evidence of
discrimination to proceed through the framework.4 8
Unhappy with the test the Court articulated for mixed-motive claims,
Congress amended Title VII in 1991.49 In doing so, Congress did not sepa-
rately delineate a type of discrimination called "mixed-motive," nor did it
enunciate a separate test.50 Rather, Congress indicated that a plaintiff could
prevail on a discrimination claim under Title VII by establishing that a
protected trait played a motivating factor in an employment decision.51
Congress also created an affirmative defense, which, if proven, would be a
partial defense to damages.52 Courts began referring to the claims brought
under the 1991 amendments as "mixed-motive" claims and analyzed them
under a two-part framework.53 Later, in 2003, the Supreme Court decided
the question it left unresolved in Price Waterhouse and held the di-
rect/circumstantial evidence dichotomy would not be imported into the
mixed-motive context under Title VII.54
During this same time period, some courts began doubting that the in-
ferences created by McDonnell Douglas made sense in reverse
discrimination cases, where the plaintiff was not a member of a historical-
45. 490 U.S. 228, 242 (1989), superseded in part by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991,
Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074.
46. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244-45. For a description of how the same decision
language was imported from constitutional claims, see Catherine T. Struve, Shifting Burdens:
Discrimination Law Through the Lens of Jury Instructions, 51 B.C. L. REV. 279, 298-301 (2010).
47. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244-45.
48. See id. at 271 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that to get the benefit of the
mixed-motive framework, the plaintiff would be required to present direct evidence of dis-
crimination).
49. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, sec. 107(a), § 703, 105 Stat. 1071,
1075 (codified as amended 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006)).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. sec. 107(a), § 703, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(m)), sec. 107(b), § 706(g), 105 Stat. 1071, 1075-76 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)). As with the disparate impact framework, when Congress added
the motivating factor language to Title VII, it did not make similar changes to the ADEA or
ADA. Struve, supra note 46, at 290, 318. In Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., the Su-
preme Court considered whether mixed-motive claims were actionable under the ADEA. It
held that plaintiffs proceeding under the ADEA must prove that age was the but-for cause of
the alleged employment action. 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2350 (2009).
53. See, e.g., Porter v. Natsios, 414 F.3d 13, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
54. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 92-93 (2003).
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ly discriminated against group. 55 Some, but not all, circuits modified
McDonnell Douglas in reverse discrimination cases to require the plaintiff
to proffer additional evidence suggesting that the employer was the rare
employer that would discriminate against men or white individuals.
5 6
By now, the reader should be able to predict how the courts would
handle harassment. During the 1970s, plaintiffs began bringing claims
alleging that they were subjected to harassment or requests for sexual fa-
vors.5 7 The number of harassment claims dramatically increased in the
early 1980s.58 In 1986, the Supreme Court officially recognized harass-
ment as a type of discrimination.59 In doing so, it began to develop a
structure for analyzing harassment and indicated that a hostile work envi-
ronment must affect the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment to
be actionable. 61 In interpreting when harassment would rise to this level,
the Court held that it must be "sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the
55. See, e.g., Eastridge v. R.I. Coll., 996 F Supp. 161, 166-67 (D.R.I. 1998) (showing
problems that result when analyzing a reverse discrimination case under the McDonnell Doug-
las framework).
56. See, e.g., Farr v. St. Francis Hosp. & Health Ctrs., 570 E3d 829, 833 (7th Cir. 2009)
(explaining that in a reverse discrimination case, the prima facie case is modified to require the
plaintiff to show that the employer discriminated against the majority or that something
"fishy" is going on (quoting Phelan v. City of Chicago, 347 F.3d 679, 684 (7th Cir. 2003))).
57. Such claims had mixed results. Some lower courts noted that employers could be
liable for harassment or requests for sexual favors, while others held that they could not. Com-
pare Miller v. Bank of Am., 600 F.2d 211, 213 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding company liable for
supervisor's demands for sexual favors), Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(finding that a female employee who was asked by a supervisor for sexual favors as a "price
for holding her job" advanced a "prima facie case of sex discrimination"), and Lucero v. Beth
Israel Hosp. & Geriatric Ctr., 479 F. Supp. 452, 454 (D. Colo. 1979) (holding company liable
for its employees' racially based harassment of other employees), with Fisher v. Flynn, 598
F.2d 663, 665-66 (lst Cir. 1979) (indicating that subjection to sexual advances was not a cog-
nizable claim under Title VII when those advances were not a but-for cause of a subsequent
employment consequence), Grayson v. Wickes Corp., 450 E Supp. 1112, 1118 (D.C. Ill.
1978) ("[T]itle VII does not make an employer responsible for every inconsiderate remark
made by office personnel" (alteration in original) (quoting Purvine v. Boyd Coffee Co., No.
75-324, 1976 WL 674, at *2 (D. Or. Oct. 26, 1976))), aff'd, 607 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1979),
and Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975) (indicating that a
discriminator's sexual advances toward a female employee appeared "to be nothing more than
a personal proclivity, peculiarity or mannerism" and were not cognizable under Title VII),
vacated on other grounds, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977).
58. See Kent D. Streseman, Note, Headshrinkers, Manmunchers, Moneygrubbers, Nuts
& Sluts: Reexamining Compelled Mental Examinations in Sexual Harassment Actions Under
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1268, 1283 n.72 (1995) (noting that the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") saw a massive increase in the number
of sexual harassment claims in the early 1980s and reporting only seventy-five sexual harass-
ment charges filed in 1980 but 3,812 in 1981). For a history of the development of sexual
harassment doctrine, see Julianne Scott, Student Scholarship, Pragmatism, Feminist Theory,
and the Reconceptualization of Sexual Harassment, 10 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 203 (1999).
59. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986).
60. Id. at 67.
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conditions of [the victim's] employment.' ",61 The Court also indicated that
the harassing conduct must be unwelcome.62
The contours of harassment law continued to develop over the next
decade. In 1993, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff alleging harass-
ment need not allege psychological injury, but would be required to
establish that she subjectively believed the work environment was hostile
or abusive and that the environment would be so viewed by an objective
person.63 In making this latter inquiry, the Court noted:
But we can say that whether an environment is "hostile" or "abusive" can be
determined only by looking at all the circumstances. These may include the
frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically
threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it un-
reasonably interferes with an employee's work performance.' 4
The prior discussion demonstrates how courts developed the current
discrimination typology. While the discussion focused on disparate im-
pact, individual disparate treatment, and harassment, it can be applied
more broadly to include failure to accommodate, 65 retaliation, 66 and pat-
61. Id. (citing Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (1 lth Cir. 1982)).
62. Id. at 68.
63. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993).
64. Id. at 23. Although there are some variations in construction, courts tend require
that a plaintiff alleging sexual harassment prove that she is a member of a protected class, that
she was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment, that the harassment was based on sex, and
that it affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment. Sandoval v. Am. Bldg. Maint.
Indus., Inc., 578 F.3d 787, 801 (8th Cir. 2009). The fourth element contains both objective and
subjective components. It requires the harassment to be "severe or pervasive enough to create
an objectively hostile or abusive work environment" as well as requires the victim to subjec-
tively perceive the working conditions to be so altered. Id. (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 21)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Even as the contours of harassment claims became fixed, employer liability for harass-
ment remained unresolved. In 1998, the Supreme Court addressed agency issues. Faragher v.
City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742
(1998). Continuing with its reliance on proof structures, the Court once again enunciated a
multipart test. An employer is liable for a supervisor's harassment if it results in a tangible
employment action. Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 762. The Court defined a tangible em-
ployment action as "a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to
promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a
significant change in benefits." Id. at 761. If a supervisor engages in harassment that does not
result in a tangible employment action, the employer will be liable for harassment unless the
employer can establish an affirmative defense. As articulated by the Court, the affirmative
defense has two elements: "(a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and
correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unrea-
sonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the
employer or to avoid harm otherwise." Id. at 765.
65. See, e.g., Gratzl v. Office of the Chief Judges of the 12th, 18th, 19th, and 22nd Judi-
cial Circuits, 601 F.3d 674, 678 (7th Cir. 2010) (discussing elements of failure to
accommodate claims under ADA). Failure to accommodate does not derive from the same
operative language as other discrimination claims. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2006) (religious
accommodation); 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(9)-(10), 12112(b)(5)(A) (disability accommodation).
66. See, e.g., Collazo v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Mfg., Inc., 617 F.3d 39, 46 (1st Cir.
2010) (citing Fantini v. Salem State Coll., 557 F.3d 22, 32 (1st Cir. 2009)) (holding that to
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tern or practice.6" In the pattern or practice context, for example, courts of-
ten express a two-part test. In the liability step, the plaintiff must establish
that the employer adopted a policy or practice to discriminate based on a
protected trait-that discrimination was the defendant's standard operating
procedure.68 If the defendant is unable to rebut the plaintiff's case, the case
proceeds to the damages stage.69
To describe the history of employment discrimination law through the
lens of frameworks is not to suggest that the Supreme Court did not face
difficult questions about the scope of employment discrimination law in
some of the cases discussed above. Nor is it to suggest that the answers to
such questions are easy. Rather, this Article argues that using frameworks
was not necessary and that the choice to use frameworks carries with it sig-
nificant negative consequences. The Article also argues that the use of the
frameworks often creates questions that might not otherwise arise-because
the questions are about the frameworks themselves, rather than about the
substantive discrimination inquiry.
B. A History of the Workplace, Changing Modes of Discrimination,
and Discrimination Theory
The prior Section presented a history of discrimination law through legal
precedent. Another way to view discrimination law historically is by con-
trasting it with changes in the workplace, with our understanding of how
discrimination happens, and with discrimination theory. This Section
demonstrates how, since the late 1980s, courts have failed to modify the
employment discrimination frameworks to reflect these changes in the
workplace. It also suggests that it is nearly impossible for courts to create
frameworks that anticipate future changes in the workplace and discrimina-
tion theory, especially given that some of these changes are responses to
court-created employment discrimination doctrines.
In the 1960s, discrimination was conceived largely as a result of animus
toward a protected group that often manifested itself in explicit company
policies.7 0 In the late 1960s and 1970s, courts began to recognize that
make out a prima facie case of retaliation the plaintiff must follow the same burden-shifting
framework as in McDonnell Douglas). At times, retaliation claims derive from a statute's
primary operative language; at other times, statutes have separate retaliation provisions. See,
e.g., Title VII § 704(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (Title VII retaliation provision); Gomez-Perez
v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474 (2008) (construing ADEA federal sector discrimination prohibition to
also prohibit retaliation).
67. See, e.g., Hohider v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 574 F.3d 169, 178 (3d Cir. 2009)
(describing pattern or practice framework). The Supreme Court enunciated the pattern or prac-
tice framework in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324
(1977), drawing from its earlier decision in Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S.
747 (1976). See also Title VII § 707(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (allowing EEOC to file pattern
or practice suits).
68. Hohider, 574 F.3d at 177-78.
69. Id.
70. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
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discrimination might not be caused by animus, but rather by seemingly neu-
tral policies that limited the opportunities of a protected class and that were
not justified by business necessity.7 Courts also recognized that women
might be disadvantaged in the workplace when subjected to sexual requests.
In the late 1980s, courts grappled with the idea that employers might be mo-
tivated by both discriminatory and nondiscriminatory reasons when making
employment decisions.7 2 In the first decades after Title VII's enactment, the
courts were constantly considering how to shape the law to handle new un-
derstandings of how discrimination occurs. Since the late 1980s, however,
the courts have appeared reluctant to adapt discrimination law, despite a
growing literature suggesting a more complex view of discrimination and its
motivations, as well as changes occurring in the workplace.
In the past twenty years, ideas about work and the workplace have radi-
cally changed. Many employees do not work in strict hierarchal structures
where one boss is responsible for making employment decisions. Rather,
employment decisions are frequently made by groups of individuals, and the
decisionmaking process is often devised or overseen by human resources
offices. Indeed, the predominance of the human resources function may, at
least in part, be a response to the employment discrimination statutes them-
selves.73 The advent of the 360-degree review means that evaluations of an
individual's job performance are not always driven by the employee's supe-
riors.74
Not only has the structure of the workplace changed, so has its makeup.
The number of women in the American workforce is about to surpass the
number of men for the first time in history.75 While no one argues that these
numbers represent gender equality in employment, they will no doubt im-
71. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971).
72. See supra notes 45-54 and accompanying text.
73. For example, a human resources department can assist employers in engaging in the
interactive process required for accommodations under the ADA and with creating, distrib-
uting, and enforcing the sexual harassment policies contemplated in the Faragher/Ellerth
affirmative defense. See, e.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 776 (1998) (dis-
cussing two-part affirmative defense); Stephen F Befort, Accommodation at Work: Lessons
from the Americans with Disabilities Act and Possibilities for Alleviating the American Worker
Time Crunch, 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'y 615, 622-28 (2004) (describing the interactive
process); Susan Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention Is a Poor Substitute for a Pound of
Cure: Confronting the Developing Jurisprudence of Education and Prevention in Employment
Discrimination Law, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 15 (2001) (discussing human re-
sources responses); Richard Carlson, The Small Firm Exemption and the Single Employer
Doctrine in Employment Discrimination Law, 80 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 1197, 1253 (2006) (not-
ing that human resources department is a risk-mitigation strategy); Hope A. Comisky,
Guidelines for Successfully Engaging in the Interactive Process to Find a Reasonable Ac-
commodation Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 13 LAB. LAW. 499, 502-09 (1998)
(discussing how an employer should engage in the process).
74. See David K. Kessler, The More You Know: How 360-Degree Feedback Could Help
Federal District Judges, 62 RUTGERs L. REv. 687, 701-02 (2010) (describing 360-degree
review).
75. Catherine Rampell, As Layoffs Surge, Women May Pass Men in Job Force, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 6, 2009, at Al.
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pact how courts view women as a protected class. It is also likely that ideas
about discrimination will continue to change as society begins to consider
whether it is entering what some have termed a "post-racial era," symbol-
ized in part by the election of President Barack Obama.76 Sex and race
discrimination are unfortunately still present, and discrimination law must
remain nimble enough to adapt to the ever-changing contours of the work-
place.
Over the past few decades, scholars also have contributed to an ever-
richer understanding of potential theoretical bases for discrimination claims.
As women have entered the workplace in increasing numbers, many have
criticized Title VII's focus on formal equality for failing to recognize the
realities of life for women, who, on average, continue to disproportionately
bear child- and elder-care responsibilities and who deal with the physical
realities of pregnancy.77 Legal theorists also criticize the failure of disparate
impact law to combat workplace policies that disproportionately affect
pregnant women or women with child- or elder-care responsibilities, such as
inflexible start times, policies prohibiting eating or drinking during work,
and policies prohibiting leave or providing limited numbers of sick days.7"
Early theories of discrimination focused on the bad motive of the em-
ployer or a particular employee.79 Research and scholarly efforts now posit
that normal mental processes, even in well-meaning individuals, may lead to
biased thinking about a protected class.80 Studies suggest that discrimination
is not a constant motive, but rather a factor that may slip in and out of deci-
sionmaking depending on the factual context. For example, one study found
that participants ranked black and white candidates equally when the candi-
dates were either plainly qualified or plainly unqualified, but gave lower
scores to marginally qualified black candidates than to similarly marginally
qualified white candidates."1
Work in intersectional discrimination has shown that discrimination may
occur in different ways at the intersection of multiple protected classes. 82
Structural discrimination theorists have proposed that the locus of discrimi-
nation is not always a bad individual or a formal company policy but rather
76. See generally Mario L. Barnes et al., A Post-Race Equal Protection?, 98 GEo L.J.
967 (2010) (discussing whether America is entering a postracial era).
77. See, e.g., Joanna L. Grossman, Pregnancy, Work, and the Promise of Equal Citizen-
ship, 98 GEO. L.J. 567, 570 (2010).
78. Id. at 582.
79. Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56
ALA. L. REV. 741, 745 (2005).
80. Id. at 746; Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckon-
ing with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322-25 (1987).
81. John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, Aversive Racism and Selection Decisions:
1989 and 1999, 11 PSYCHOL. Sci. 315, 315 (2000).
82. See, e.g., Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A
Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Poli-
tics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (arguing that discrimination theory does not fully address
discrimination against black women).
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workplace structures that allow and encourage discrimination.83 Others have
questioned whether women and people of color suffer discrimination by
being required to adopt workplace identities that are structured on white,
male norms.
84
Recent research also raises serious questions about how free from bias
seemingly neutral evaluations are. These studies suggest that women are eval-
uated differently than men even when judged on the same criteria, and that
such evaluations may change based on whether the woman is in a traditionally
male-dominated field and whether she is pregnant or a mother.85 Studies have
shown that a pregnant woman receives lower evaluations than a nonpregnant
woman performing the same task.86 A woman's pregnancy may cause others
to view her as overly emotional, irrational, and less committed to her job.87
Research shows that when people complain about "discrimination," they
are complaining not only about large workplace decisions but also about
smaller ones, such as social isolation or biased evaluations.88 Discrimination
theorists have pointed out that the day-to-day, small insults of discrimina-
tion-referred to as microagressions-can have significant effects on
workers.8 9 Research also suggests even low levels of disproportionate im-
pact can have huge effects on the advancement of women and people of
color within organizations.9"
83. Ryan Light et al., Racial Discrimination, Interpretation, and Legitimation at Work,
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 39 (Mar. 2011) (noting the way in which workplace
policies contribute to discrimination); Pager & Shepherd, supra note 3, 193-94, 197 (discuss-
ing research regarding organizational dynamics and discrimination); Tristin K. Green,
Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment
Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 138 (2003).
84. E.g., Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV.
1259, 1262-63 (2000).
85. See Grossman, supra note 77, at 577.
86. E.g., Jane A. Halpert et al., Pregnancy as a Source of Bias in Performance Apprais-
als, 14 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 649, 655 (1993).
87. Id.
88. One study has stated as follows:
Because [women's] input may be deemed less valuable, they are more likely than men to
be omitted from key discussions, overlooked when perspectives are being sought about
important decisions, and left out of informal networks that provide the context for critical
information-sharing. Others in the workplace are less likely to come to them for help
precisely because they are viewed as lacking essential traits for success, thus creating a
system where women are cut off from opportunities to exert influence.
Brian Welle & Madeline E. Heilman, Formal and Informal Discrimination Against Women at
Work: The Role of Gender Stereotypes 29 (Ctr. for Pub. Leadership Working Paper Series, No.
05-02, 2005), available at http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/l721.1/55933.
89. See generally Peggy C. Davis, Law as Microaggression, 98 YALE L.J. 1559 (1989)
(describing microaggression and how it affects those subjected to it).
90. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, MEASURING RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 223-24
(Rebecca M. Blank et al. eds., 2004).
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Current doctrine makes incorrect factual assumptions about the level of
harm that a plaintiff must experience before her claim is actionable. 9' Even
though workers report feeling discrimination through both large and small
actions, the current typology focuses on large problems, with disparate im-
pact captured by the concept of gross statistical disparities and disparate
treatment still focused on actions such as termination, failure to hire, demo-
tion, or severe or pervasive harassment.92
The current discrimination frameworks remain largely unconnected to
this changing practical and theoretical landscape. The division of discrimi-
nation claims into intentional claims and disparate impact claims ignores
that discrimination may result from a combination of unconscious bias and
traditionally conceived intentional bias,93 or perhaps through unconscious
bias alone. Neither disparate impact nor disparate treatment recognizes the
possibility of negligent discrimination. 94 Structural discrimination is not
fully captured within any of the frameworks.
In the individual disparate treatment context, courts largely seem to view
discrimination as being motivated by an individual who possesses a bad mo-
tive.95 The proof structures appear tied to a concept of discrimination that
seeks to ferret out a single decisionmaker (or small group of decisionmak-
ers) who acted with a certain kind of animus toward an individual plaintiff.
This narrow concept of intent ignores the possibility of disparate influences
and structural discrimination. And none of the proof structures appropriately
captures intersectional discrimination.
Further, courts have failed to fully explore whether the substantive equali-
ty model underlying disparate impact applies in other contexts96 or whether
the current disparate impact tests fairly capture all conduct that might limit a
plaintiff's opportunities. Plaintiffs who are unable to offer proof of specific
practices that create gross statistical disparities under the disparate impact
framework are largely left with models based on formal equality.97
91. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993) (requiring that harassment
be severe or pervasive); Watson v. Potter, 351 F. App'x 103, 105-06 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding
that warning letters, poor performance evaluations, and incorrectly marking an employee
absent without leave were not adverse employment actions under Title VII).
92. See, e.g., Richard F. Martell et al., Male-Female Differences: A Computer Simula-
tion, 51 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 157-58 (1996).
93. This Article does not express any opinion on whether unconscious bias is intention-
al or not. Rather, this sentence is meant to contrast unconscious discrimination with more
traditional ways of conceiving intentional discrimination as conscious.
94. For a description of negligent discrimination, see generally David Benjamin Op-
penheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899 (1993).
95. See Martin, supra note 2, at 374.
96. See, e.g., Grossman, supra note 77, at 567, 604-05 (discussing the formal and sub-
stantive equality divide).
97. Spivey v. Beverly Enter., Inc., 196 F.3d 1309, 1314 (11 th Cir. 1999) (rejecting claim
that employer's refusal to grant modified work to pregnant women created a disparate impact,
because plaintiff failed to present evidence of gross statistical disparity).
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The point of the Section is not to argue for or against a particular con-
ception of discrimination or the workplace, but rather to argue that the broad
operative provisions of federal antidiscrimination statutes at least require
courts to consider such arguments. Since the late 1980s, however, courts
have largely failed to consider new ways of thinking about discrimination
and have instead chosen to rely on the existing typology. As discussed
throughout this Article, courts should return to the primary language of the
federal statutes' operative provisions to explore when an employee's terms
and conditions of employment are affected because of a protected trait.
It could plausibly be argued that current dilemmas with discrimination
law are caused not by the frameworks but by the courts' failure to add more
frameworks over the past two decades. As discussed in Part 1II, though, the
problems inherent in exploring discrimination through typology are unlikely
to be fixed with more frameworks. Just as the current frameworks have been
unable to keep up with changes in the workplace and new understandings of
discrimination, it is likely that future attempts would suffer from the same
problems. Further, the sheer number of frameworks makes them procedural-
ly, doctrinally, and theoretically inconsistent and confusing.
II. How THE FRAMEWORKS SQUEEZE OUT
POTENTIALLY COGNIZABLE CLAIMS
When considering discrimination claims, judges first tend to place the
claim within a particular category and then funnel the evidence through ru-
brics associated with that category. This two-step process provides the court
with a framework through which to view the claim. This Part shows how the
frameworks squeeze out cases that potentially establish discrimination under
the federal statutes. To that end, this Part is meant to provide illustrations of
the squeeze-out effect, which is further examined in subsequent Parts.
Courts ignore potentially cognizable claims in two ways. First, even
when a plaintiff's theory of the case fits within recognized categories of dis-
crimination, the claim may be rejected if it does not neatly fit within an
accepted rubric. This happens, in part, because the rubrics often fail to re-
flect the language of the discrimination statutes. And in many cases, courts
do not question whether the rubrics ask the correct questions. Second, the
frameworks allow courts to implicitly reject new theories of discrimination
without explicitly considering their merits. 98
For employment discrimination frameworks to work as a decisionmak-
ing device, they must facilitate appropriate inquiries. Unfortunately, some of
the frameworks provide a standard that is higher than or different from the
standard provided in the statute. For example, the sexual harassment rubric
98. Indeed, this type of reasoning explains, at least in part, the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2451, 2553, 2555-56 (2011), in which the
majority opinion failed to analyze whether a claim was viable if it drew from several different
types of discrimination. This Article does not claim that the frameworks universally cause
such problems, but that these problems occur consistently and in enough cases that they
should cause concern.
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asks whether a plaintiff can establish that the conduct was severe or perva-
sive. In determining whether this standard is met, courts consider many
factors, including whether the harassment is physically threatening.9 9 The
statutory language, however, simply asks whether the activity affects the
terms or conditions of employment.1°" In case after case, courts grant sum-
mary judgment for the employer when there is evidence that the conditions
of employment have been affected by sex or race. Courts have granted
summary judgment in the employer's favor in each of the following cases:
When a supervisor commented on the plaintiff's figure, told her to wear
tighter clothing and told her she was hot;...
When a supervisor called a woman a "pretty girl," made grunting noises as
she left his office wearing a leather skirt, told her that his office did not get
"hot" until she stepped into it, joked that "all pretty girls [should] run
around naked" in the office, likened her to Anita Hill in acknowledging his
tendency to share comments of a sexual nature with her at the office, and
once made gestures suggesting masturbation while conversing;0 2
When the plaintiff alleged co-workers used the "N-word" to refer to
participants in a program the plaintiff supervised, alleged an executive re-
ferred to those participants as pigs and described an African-American as a
"token black," and alleged that racist behavior and racist jokes were toler-
ated. 0
These events affect the terms and conditions of employment, yet the frame-
works do not ask the same questions posed in the statute. In other words, the
severe or pervasive standard may direct courts to impose a standard on
plaintiffs higher than that required by Title VII's statutory language.
This Article extensively details the disconnect between the McDonnell
Douglas test and the statutory language, including the test's sometimes-
counterfactual assumption that an inference of discrimination should arise
based on proof of a prima facie case, as well as its narrow conception of
intent and pretext."° Even in cases where plaintiffs present evidence that
99. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993).
100. Title VII § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 20OOe-2(a) (2006).
101. See Webb-Edwards v. Orange Cnty. Sheriff's Office, 525 E3d 1013, 1027 (1lth Cir.
2008). It could be argued that the harassment problem is not a framework issue, but a disa-
greement regarding the substantive limits of harassment law. As discussed in Section III.A.,
however, the creation of a harassment framework allowed the Supreme Court to downplay the
statutory text and to not address whether the framework fully captures the breadth of statutory
possibility. Further, the cases that gave rise to the harassment inquiry present fairly extreme
instances of harassment, and it is difficult to understand how the Court could determine the
extent of potential liability using these cases. See Section III.A.
102. Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir. 1995) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
103. Kelly v. Senior Ctrs., Inc., 169 F. App'x 423, 425 (6th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
104. In particular, there is no reason to think that a plaintiff who shows the traditional
prima facie case should be able to prevail on a claim of reverse discrimination, and it also is
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they might have been treated differently because of a protected trait, courts
use the McDonnell Douglas framework to find no cognizable claim. °5
The most high-profile example of this is O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin
Caterers Corp.106 In that case, the district court granted summary judgment
in favor of the employer. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the decision, reasoning
that the plaintiff did not have evidence that he was replaced by someone
outside his protected class (for the ADEA, under the age of forty), as re-
quired under McDonnell Douglas. The plaintiff, who was fifty-six, wanted
to use evidence that he was replaced by a forty-year-old to support other
evidence of discrimination, such as his supervisor's comments that the
plaintiff was "too damn old" and that the company needed "young blood. 10 7
After three years of appellate litigation, the Supreme Court eventually clari-
fied that the plaintiff was not required to prove replacement by someone
outside the protected class, only that the comparator was young enough to
establish an inference of discrimination. In this case, the framework directed
lower courts away from common sense and from the proper discrimination
inquiry.
This phenomenon happens in other cases as well. Take, for example, the
case of Michael Harmon, a fifty-seven-year-old man who had worked for a
company for twenty-eight years without any negative performance evalua-
tions.108 He worked as a district manager, again without negative
performance evaluations, for three years before the company hired a new
supervisor.109 Near the end of the plaintiff's employment, the company hired
doubtful that the presumption should arise in every case in which a member of one historically
discriminated against group is preferred over a member of another such group.
105. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 197 F.3d 688 (5th Cir. 1999) (reversing
jury verdict and finding that plaintiff had not established age discrimination even though he
had evidence of age-related comments and that the reason for his discharge was not factually
correct), rev'd, 530 U.S. 133 (2000). The Fifth Circuit misunderstood how the first and third
steps of the McDonnell Douglas test worked in relation to one another. While this problem
might be technically complex from a framework perspective, it is difficult to understand how
an age discrimination verdict can be reversed and a judgment entered for an employer when
the plaintiff had evidence that he was told he was "too damn old to do the job" and that he was
so old he must have "come over on the Mayflower." Id. at 691; see also Ash v. Tyson Foods,
Inc., Civ. A. 96-RRA-3257-M, 2004 WL 5138005 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 26, 2004) (granting judg-
ment as a matter of law in favor of employer by using cramped interpretation of pretext, even
though plaintiff had evidence to support race discrimination claim, including that supervisor
had referred to him as "boy"), rev'd, 546 U.S. 454 (2006); Holiness v. Moore-Handley, Inc.,
114 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1183-84 (N.D. Ala 1999) (using McDonnell Douglas to grant summary
judgment in favor of employer, even though plaintiff had evidence that supervisors disap-
proved of black employee's relationship with a white coworker).
106. 517 U.S. 308 (1996).
107. O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 829 F. Supp. 155, 158 (W.D.N.C. 1993),
aff'd, 56 F.3d 542 (4th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 517 U.S. 308 (1996) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).
108. Harmon v. Earthgrains Baking Cos., No. 08-5227, 2009 WL 332705, at *1 (6th Cir.
Feb. 11,2009).
109. Id.
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a thirty-two-year-old to supervise him. 0 On one occasion, the new supervi-
sor told Mr. Harmon: "I bet you think that your older people are your best
people .... well, they're not. They're not your best people."'' Two months
later, Mr. Harmon received a negative evaluation from his new supervisor. 12
The new supervisor hired two individuals-a twenty-five-year-old and a
thirty-seven-year-old-for positions similar to the plaintiff's position."3
Two months later, the supervisor recommended that Mr. Harmon be
terminated after the supervisor found out that two drivers under Mr. Har-
mon's supervision were involved in vehicle accidents that Mr. Harmon did
not report to higher management. The supervisor claimed that it was com-
pany policy to report such accidents, while Mr. Harmon asserted that he did
not know about any company policy requiring the further reporting of vehi-
cle accidents.' At summary judgment, the employer could not produce any
evidence of a written accident-reporting policy, and a company official indi-
cated that the policy that had been conveyed to Mr. Harmon was not
accurate. Even though this type of issue would normally have resulted in
less serious discipline under company policy, the company terminated Mr.
Harmon." 5 An employee who was ten years younger than Mr. Harmon ab-
sorbed his duties.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer,
and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed." 16 Very predictably,
the court first considered whether the plaintiff had direct evidence of dis-
crimination and, finding that he did not, began to funnel the case through the
McDonnell Douglas test.' '1 The appellate court found that Mr. Harmon was
not able to show that he had been replaced by a younger employee, because
his job responsibilities were absorbed by a current employee." 8 The plain-
tiff's case failed because he could not make out a prima facie case under the
traditionally stated McDonnell Douglas test, which the courts articulated as
requiring replacement by a younger individual." 9
Recall that the primary question under the ADEA is whether a plaintiff
is terminated because of his age. 12 Here, the plaintiff had evidence of the
following: one potentially discriminatory comment, the hiring of a younger
manager who immediately began to report problems with the plaintiff, the
110. Id.
11. Id. at * 1-2 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted),
112. Id. at *2.
113. Id. at *4.
114. Jd. at *2.
115. See id.
116. Id. at *3.
117. Id. at *3-4.
118. Id. at *5.
119. Id. The opinion continued by considering whether the plaintiff could establish pre-
text; however, the court considered only whether the plaintiff had any evidence to suggest that
the employer's transfer of the plaintiff's job duties to another person was because of age. Id.
120. See supra note 9.
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younger manager's decision to hire younger workers for similar slots, a
twenty-eight-year track record with the company, and two instances in which
the company did not follow its own policies. While this evidence is not
enough to mandate judgment for the plaintiff, it does create an arguable ques-
tion of fact about whether the company terminated the plaintiff because of his
age. Nonetheless, the McDonnell Douglas framework did not encourage the
court to engage in a searching inquiry regarding whether discrimination
occurred.
If courts reject claims that fall within accepted types but outside of tradi-
tionally accepted rubrics, it makes sense that the frameworks also make it
difficult to prove hybrid claims-that is, claims that draw from one or more of
the current types of discrimination but that may not be able to meet the sepa-
rate proof requirements of any one particular type.
Consider the following case as an example. Two older employees were
terminated for violating hospital policy regarding patient privacy.12' The
employees had evidence that they received verbal permission to obtain X-
rays from a patient's mother, and there was no written policy regarding the
type of permission needed.122 Indeed, one of the plaintiffs was the patient's
grandmother.'23 Nevertheless, the hospital terminated the employees and
replaced them with younger workers. 124 The employees also had evidence
that, at the time of their termination, the hospital was undertaking a cost-
cutting initiative in which employees with seniority were being targeted and
replaced with cheaper employees. 25 The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the employer, and the appellate court affirmed. The
court first analyzed the case under McDonnell Douglas's narrow conception
of pretext and then under disparate impact.1 26 Yet the court failed to consider
whether the hospital's overall efforts to terminate employees based on sen-
iority (not based on age) could have created an environment where
individual supervisors started looking for infractions by older employees in
an attempt to get rid of them.
Or take, for example, an employer who uses a multistep promotion pro-
cess, with some facially neutral elements and other discriminatory elements.
Courts faced with a similar case under the current regime would have diffi-
culty analyzing such a claim without breaking it into two separate claims: a
disparate impact claim and a disparate treatment claim. Requiring the plain-
121. Allen v. Highlands Hosp. Corp., 545 F.3d 387, 391 (6th Cir. 2008).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 397.
124. Brief of Appellant at 2, Allen v. Highlands Hosp. Corp., 545 F.3d 387 (6th Cir.
2008) (No. 07-6414), 2007 WL 5580904.
125. Allen, 545 F.3d at 392; see also Brief of Appellant, supra note 124, at 12 (describ-
ing how magistrate judge denied plaintiffs the discovery needed to fully make disparate
impact case).
126. Allen, 545 F.3d at 398-400.
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tiff to offer proof under both rubrics, however, may be more than the statute
requires. 127
This problem will become more pronounced as courts begin to use dif-
ferent rubrics to evaluate similar types of claims under Title VII and the
ADEA. For example, it is not now clear how a plaintiff who claims that a
practice created a disparate impact based on both age and gender would
proceed, given that there is one rubric for Title VII claims and another for
ADEA claims.121
Finally, the frameworks make it easy for courts to avoid explicitly re-
solving complex questions regarding new types of discrimination. Consider
the question of whether structural discrimination is a viable claim.1 29 The
following hypothetical shows that by proceeding strictly through the frame-
works, it is easy to dismiss a structural discrimination claim without ever
truly addressing whether such a claim should be viable under the federal
statutes. 130
A company hosts after-work social events for its employees that focus
on activities that are traditionally seen as male activities, such as playing
golf or other sports. Many women in the workplace feel uncomfortable do-
ing these activities, but feel that they are required to participate. Women
who do not attend the events or who perform poorly at them often receive
odd criticisms in their evaluations. The employees are evaluated on subjec-
tive qualities such as the ability to "fit in."
The company has a very strict absence policy that provides employees
with two weeks of leave each year. Over the years, a number of senior, male
managers have made comments about the ability of women to work at the
company or have made sexualized comments about the appearance of wom-
en at the company. For example, men have referred to some of the
secretaries as "hot" and have asked them to wear tighter clothes. One man-
ager indicated that women should quit after they have babies, and another
asked a woman whether she slept her way to the top. These comments do
not meet the legal definition of harassment, but the comments are frequently
127. See, e.g., Mangold v. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1995)
(holding that it did not matter that disparate treatment and disparate impact jury questions
were combined, because plaintiffs' facts were sufficient to establish intentional discrimina-
tion). For other descriptions of facts that cut across various frameworks, see Tristin Green's
account of the facts of Ledbetter v. Goodyear in Insular Individualism: Employment Discrimi-
nation Law After Ledbetter v. Goodyear, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 353, 364 (2008). See
also Eisha Jain, Note, Realizing the Potential of the Joint Harassment/Retaliation Claim, 117
YALE L.J. 120 (2007) (describing combined disparate treatment and retaliation claims).
128. See Title VII § 703(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2006) (providing rubric for Title
VII disparate impact); Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005) (describing the
rubric under the ADEA).
129. See supra Section I.B.
130. For another example of structural discrimination, see Tristin Green, Work Culture
and Discrimination, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 623, 642-43 (2005).
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repeated by employees, and most of the female employees are aware of
them.'31 The company has never repudiated the comments.
Over the years, a handful of women have complained about some of the-
se practices, but they have not been corrected. Several women quit in
response to the general environment at the company. Most of the managers
in the company are men, and there is a noticeable drop-off in the number of
women at senior levels of management.
On one annual evaluation, a woman receives comments that she is "too
aggressive" and that she needs to try better to fit in. On the next evaluation,
the same woman receives a comment that she is "too emotional." No other
comments are made toward or about this particular woman. Neither of the
comments affects her compensation, but she feels as though the cards are
stacked against her for future promotion decisions. Assume that the woman
subsequently sues the company for discrimination.
Under the current discrimination frameworks, the woman's case likely
would not survive summary judgment, and the court will never have to ex-
plicitly decide whether structural discrimination is a viable claim.'32 When
the court views the evidence, it will probably divide the evidence into
frameworks and determine how the evidence fits into the frameworks. If a
plaintiff cannot establish discrimination through any of the frameworks, her
claims will fail.
The case is not a pattern or practice claim, because courts tend to require
the plaintiff to establish the pattern or practice with similar types of em-
ployment decisions or actions, not by simply aggregating all incidents that
occur in the workplace. Further, some courts require pattern or practice
claims brought by private plaintiffs to be raised as class actions.'33
The courts tend to view disparate impact, individual disparate treatment,
and harassment separately. This scenario presents a mixture of each, along
with some negligent conduct. It is likely that structural problems and uncon-
131. For a discussion of the differences between the ways in which members of different
classes perceive the work environment, see Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108
COLUM. L. REV. 1093 (2008).
132. Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 548 F. Supp. 2d 1203 (D. Kan. 2008), aff'd, 555 F.3d
1182 (10th Cir. 2009); Semsroth v. City of Wichita, No. 04-1245-MLB, 2007 WL 1246223
(D. Kan. Apr. 27, 2007), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 304 F. App'x 707 (10th Cir. 2008). In
Ezold v. Wolf Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1992), the Third Circuit
reversed a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, holding that the plaintiff could not establish pre-
text in the finn's decision not to make her partner. In doing so, the appellate court narrowly
framed the pretext inquiry, which allowed it to ignore other evidence of discrimination. Id. at
526 (focusing narrowly on the employer's asserted reason for its decision). But see Ezold v.
Wolf Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 751 F. Supp. 1175 (E.D. Pa. 1992). Indeed, the district
court's recitation of the facts suggests that structural discrimination might have existed at the
firm. Id. at 1178 (noting that plaintiff was given smaller matters on which to work than those
assigned to male associates, that one partner viewed her as incapable of handling large mat-
ters, and that plaintiff might have been viewed negatively because of her concerns regarding
women's issues); see also Powell v. Dallas Morning News L.P., Civil Action No. 3:06-CV-
1960-BF, 2011 WL 1119775 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2011) (dividing and subdividing evidence
into frameworks, but never considering the evidence as a whole).
133. See, e.g., Celestine v. Petroleos deVenez. SA, 266 F.3d 343, 355 (5th Cir. 2001).
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scious bias contribute to the discriminatory environment. For example, the
company thoughtlessly structures its social activities to cater to men and
then allows participation in these events to affect performance evaluations.
They schedule the events at times that may make it more difficult for people
with child care responsibilities to attend, and then factor attendance into
performance evaluations. The supervisor may be making too much of the
woman's inability to "fit in," and the work environment may make it harder
for the woman to fit in.
The absence policy may have a disparate impact on pregnant women or
mothers. Because the woman does not claim to be directly affected by this
conduct, however, she cannot prevail on that claim. The absence policy may
contribute to the fact that there are few female managers in the workplace,
which may itself be a reason why other women feel that the environment is
discriminatory.
The comments by the male managers set a tone for the business, provide
a context for the lack of women in management, and lend support to the
plaintiff's belief that her evaluations are discriminatory and that she faces a
tough road to be promoted to a management position. However, the com-
ments are not severe or pervasive enough to constitute actionable harass-
harassment. Further, the court is likely to assign less persuasive value to
comments that were not made directly to the plaintiff.134 Some courts may
find that the comments and evaluations were not part of the same conduct
and thus foreclose a harassment claim.135 Even when combined with the
comments made in her evaluation, the plaintiff is still unlikely to be able to
meet the severe or pervasive standard required for harassment. The fact that
the company did not respond to the complaints about the effects of all of the
discriminatory conduct also supports the plaintiff's assertions, but the court
may only view complaints about similar conduct as relevant.
The plaintiff cannot prevail on her individual disparate treatment claim
because receiving two negative evaluations (without a corresponding com-
pensation decision) does not create a cognizable adverse employment
action. She might wait until she was denied a management position and then
sue, but few women are likely to invest their human capital in such an en-
deavor. Even if the evaluation results in a discriminatory compensation
decision, the plaintiff may be unable to convince the court that some or all
of her evidence is connected to that decision.
134. See, e.g., Tall v. United Parcel Serv. Co., No. 3:09CV-742-H, 2011 WL 767224, at
*6 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 25, 2011) (indicating that comments not directed at the plaintiff are consid-
ered less severe); Thompson v. Mem'l Hosp. of Carbondale, 625 F.3d 394, 401 (7th Cir. 2010)
(downplaying comments that happened outside plaintiff's presence).
135. See, e.g., Morris v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 435 F. Supp. 2d 887, 903 (N.D. Iowa 2005)
(indicating that alleged incidents by coworkers and supervisors could not be used to establish
harassment claim). Indeed, limitations periods for filing a charge of discrimination under Title
VII, the ADEA, and the ADA often depend upon whether the plaintiff can establish that her
allegations are part of the same course of harassment or represent separate courses of conduct
or a combination of discrete and discriminatory acts. See id. at 908.
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This hypothetical strongly suggests that the female employee may have
been treated differently in the terms, conditions, and privileges of her em-
ployment based on her sex and that broader discrimination is happening in
the workplace. However, this case is also one in which the frameworks
could justify summary judgment in the employer's favor. Further, the court
could dismiss the case without ever grappling with complex questions re-
garding structural discrimination. The next Part discusses why these
decisions would occur.
III. WHY THE FRAMEWORKS LEAD TO FAULTY DECISIONMAKING
While some blame for discrimination law's problems can be placed on
particular court opinions, this Part argues that a more appropriate and im-
portant source of fault may lie with the way that courts structure the
discrimination inquiry. An analysis of the organizational structure demon-
strates that when courts use typology to shape the discrimination inquiry
they tend to do so in a way that prevents a full exploration of the statutory
regime.
This Part begins by describing how frameworks are tied, both theoreti-
cally and factually, to the Supreme Court cases in which they were created.
Sections III.B and II.C explore one of the most problematic aspects of these
frameworks: the metanarrative that guides courts in using them. This
metanarrative is a sometimes explicit but often unspoken set of assumptions
about how the frameworks operate. Courts often assume that the articulated
frameworks represent the complete universe for thinking about employment
discrimination. They also presume that frameworks are separate, rather than
integrated, parts of a larger regime.
A. The Frameworks Suffer from Fact and Theory Capture
Although the frameworks are ostensibly designed for broad application,
they often are wedded to the particular facts or theory underlying the cases
in which they were created. Indeed, one of the key drawbacks of litigating
by frameworks is that judges may not be able to fully transcend the facts of
the case before them or their own factual assumptions about discrimination.
Nor can judges fully anticipate how future changes in the workplace or un-
derstandings about discrimination law will alter the evidence that plaintiffs
bring to prove their claims. Enshrining the facts or theories of particular
cases into frameworks is problematic, especially when combined with the
tendency of lower courts to assume that the frameworks represent the full
possibility of statutory claims. This practice creates an unduly limited lens
through which to view discrimination.
Let's start with McDonnell Douglas. Embedded within the McDonnell
Douglas inquiry are several sets of facts that masquerade as legal standards.
First, the test considers whether the plaintiff was qualified for the position in
question. The legal framework mandates consideration of an employee's
qualifications, even when the employer's reasons for an employment deci-
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sion do not relate to the employee's qualifications and may not be relevant
to the underlying discrimination inquiry. In the McDonnell Douglas case
itself, this prong was not problematic because the parties agreed that the
plaintiff was qualified for the job he sought. 3 6 In other cases, however, this
inquiry sometimes sidetracks courts into thinking about whether the plaintiff
is a "bad" employee or an unqualified applicant instead of whether discrim-
ination occurred, 3 7 and it creates an extra incentive for the employer to cast
the employee as unqualified.
One common articulation of McDonnell Douglas allows the plaintiff to
create a prima facie case by showing that she was a member of a protected
group, that she applied for a position for which she was qualified, that she
was not hired, and that a person outside of the protected group was chosen
instead.'38 After this prima facie case is met, a rebuttable presumption of
discrimination arises.139 Creating a presumption of discrimination may make
sense if one is thinking about cases that fall into particular fact patterns. But
there is little reason to think that the presumption should arise in other fac-
tual scenarios, such as when 100 people apply for one position and the
employer chooses the most qualified person. Further, the comparison re-
quired in the prima facie case presumes that the plaintiff will be a member
of a historically discriminated against group. Thus, it is questionable wheth-
er the presumption makes sense in reverse discrimination cases. Questions
remain regarding how the prima facie case should work when the plaintiff
alleges intersectional discrimination or when the favored employee is also a
member of a historically discriminated against group.
The pretext framework also enshrines a limited conception of workplace
decisionmaking. The question in McDonnell Douglas was whether the com-
pany discriminated against the plaintiff because of his illegal protest
activities or whether the company used these activities as an excuse to cover
up a racially motivated decision not to rehire him. The McDonnell Douglas
test, therefore, focuses on a single decision made at a particular point in
time. In other situations with multiple players and multiple decisions or ac-
tions being taken over time, McDonnell Douglas has proven problematic. 41
Further, based on the facts of the initial case, the McDonnell Douglas
inquiry made a big assumption-that there would be two competing narra-
tives of what occurred in the workplace, one based on legitimate reasons
and the other based on discriminatory ones. The framework is set up to find
136. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 796 (1973).
137. See, e.g., Nicholson v. Hyannis Air Serv., Inc., 580 F.3d 1116, 1123 (9th Cir. 2009)
(noting that district court improperly considered subjective qualifications in prima facie case);
Kulik v. Med. Imaging Res., Inc., 325 F. App'x 413, 414 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that district
court improperly relied on subjective qualifications to determine whether plaintiff made a
prima facie case).
138. See, e.g., Godoy v. Habersham Cnty., 211 F. App'x 850, 853 (11 th Cir. 2006).
139. Id.
140. See, e.g., Michael J. Zimmer, A Chain of Inferences Proving Discrimination, 79 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1243, 1285-86 (2008) (discussing problems with using McDonnell Douglas in
mixed-motive situations).
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the reason for the employer's actions and is thus not well suited to factual
scenarios where multiple factors are at work. Given its limitations, McDon-
nell Douglas was not set up to do the work required for mixed-motive
claims without substantial revision. These limitations thus necessitated new
tests to deal with mixed motives and created confusion about whether such
claims were cognizable under the federal discrimination statutes.
The McDonnell Douglas test also funnels the discrimination inquiry
into a narrowly defined version of pretext, which affects how courts think
about intent.'14 Such an inquiry assumes that discrimination results from
an intentional act or discrete series of acts, and it envisions that the truth
can be ferreted out by simply considering whether the plaintiff's or the
defendant's articulated reason for the employment action is true. While
this account of discrimination may be correct in certain cases, it simplifies
workplace realities and undertheorizes discrimination. 42 In some cases,
the employer may be telling the truth about the reason for its actions, but
that truth may result from embedded discrimination.'43 Similarly, the pre-
text inquiry limits courts' willingness to consider claims of unconscious
discrimination 144 and structural discrimination, which do not fall neatly
within the contours of the McDonnell Douglas test.
Disparate impact analysis suffers from the same problems. The Su-
preme Court first recognized disparate impact claims in Griggs, in the
context of standardized tests and diploma requirements that created built-
in headwinds for black employees. 145 Some courts view the theoretical
underpinning of the disparate impact framework as an attempt to remedy
the residue of past discrimination. 46 This theoretical tie limits the useful-
141. See Hart, supra note 79, at 749, 756-57.
142. See Ann C. McGinley, Discrimination Redefined, 75 Mo. L. REv. 443, 450-51
(2010).
143. See, e.g., Jason Zengerle, Black Quarterbacks Are Underpaid, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13,
2009 (Magazine), at MM30.
144. See Oppenheimer, supra note 94, at 900 (describing negligent discrimination as
occurring when an employer fails "to take all reasonable steps to prevent discrimination that it
knows or should know is occurring, or that it expects or should expect to occur"). Uncon-
scious discrimination occurs when normal cognitive processes or cultural indoctrination cause
an individual to unthinkingly harbor negative ideas about a protected class, and those thoughts
then manifest themselves in an employment action without express animus. Hart, supra note
79; see also Michael Selmi, Response to Professor Wax: Discrimination as Accident: Old
Whine, New Bottle, 74 IND. L.J. 1233, 1236 (1999) (indicating that it is difficult to define un-
conscious discrimination). In some instances, unconscious discrimination and negligent
discrimination may overlap. For example, it may be possible to hold an employer liable for
unconscious discrimination when it allows unconscious discrimination to manifest itself in
employment decisions in ways that one might expect the employer to know about and correct.
145. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,431-32(1971).
146. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Jackson, 351 E3d 183, 202 (5th Cir. 2003) (Stewart, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing how the majority improperly limited
Griggs by holding that it was tied to remedying historic discrimination), aff'd on other
grounds, 544 U.S. 228 (2005).
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ness of the framework in other contexts. 147 For example, some courts have
expressed hostility toward claims that employers discriminate against
women by failing to provide ample leave, reasoning that "disparate impact
liability is a means of dealing with the residues of past discrimination,
rather than a warrant for favoritism."'' 48 Other courts have refused to con-
sider disparate impact claims that benefit cuts and wage cuts correlated
with age because these cuts were not "built-in headwinds.' 1 49 Reluctance
to fully explore the possibility that such claims establish disparate impact
is driven by the theory of Griggs.
Further, the idea that disparate impact and disparate treatment are sep-
arate concepts comes from Griggs. In that case, the Court emphasized that
the lower courts had not found intentional discrimination under the facts
of the case. From Griggs forward, courts began to think about disparate
impact as a separate category of discrimination from intentional claims. As
discussed below, while some cases do fall within only one of the catego-
ries, the strict separation of the categories prevents some plaintiffs from
establishing a claim, even where the facts suggests that discrimination has
occurred. Professor Tristin Green has noted that disparate impact theory
"fails to capture [the] interplay between individuals and the organizations
within which they work ... [by] focusing on the unequal effect or conse-
quence ... rather than on the ways in which institutional structure,
systems, and dynamics enable the operation of discriminatory bias."'5 °
Similar problems affect harassment law. The harassment inquiry en-
shrines the idea that harassment does not affect the terms or conditions of
an employee's work environment unless it is severe. This is a factual as-
sumption made by judges, however, and does not reflect the statutory
language, which only requires that the terms or conditions of plaintiff's
employment were affected or that the conduct did or tended to deprive a
plaintiff of employment opportunities.
The plaintiff in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson certainly raised severe
allegations of harassment; she alleged that she was fondled at work and
raped by her supervisor.'' But the justices thinking about this set of facts
and beginning to define a harassment framework against the contours of
those facts likely did not consider the full range of conduct that might alter
147. See, e.g., Troupe v. May Dep't Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 1994); Walker
v. E. Allen Cnty. Schs., No. 1:08CV 32 PPS, 2010 WL 1652958, at *5 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 23,
2010) ("[A] market based response to economic adversity is not the type of situation disparate
impact claims were intended to address.").
148. Troupe, 20 F.3d at 738.
149. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432 (internal quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., Finnegan v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 967 F.2d 1161, 1164 (7th Cir. 1992) ("The concept of disparate
impact was developed for the purpose of identifying situations where, through inertia or insen-
sitivity, companies were following policies that gratuitously-needlessly-although not
necessarily deliberately, excluded black or female workers from equal employment opportuni-
ties." (citations omitted)).
150. Green, supra note 83, at 138.
151. 477 U.S. 57, 60 (1986).
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the terms and conditions of a person's employment-which is the standard
required by the statute. While physical assault certainly is serious enough
to warrant federal protection, using a framework established in this factual
context means that conduct that is arguably prohibited under the broad
statutory language is not prohibited under the court-created framework.
In ways both large and small, the discrimination frameworks remain
factually and theoretically captured by the original cases in which they
were decided. These limitations are problematic because the frameworks
purport to be designed to have broad future applicability. The memoriali-
zation of facts and theories into frameworks unnecessarily cabins the
discrimination inquiry into a narrow band of theoretical and factual possi-
bility.
B. Courts Tend to View the Frameworks as Complete
In general, courts apply the current frameworks as if they represented a
complete lens through which to view discrimination claims.'52 If a set of
facts does not fit within a recognized framework, it is not considered to
violate the statutes, and the claim is therefore not cognizable. Given that
the frameworks were under rapid development in the 1970s and 1980s, it
seems rather shortsighted to treat the current iterations as complete. This
state of affairs is even more perplexing considering the changes in the
workplace and discrimination theory that have occurred over the last two
decades. Yet courts persist, both explicitly and implicitly, to think of the
recognized structures as representing the entire set of analytical tools
available to evaluate discrimination claims.
Such assumptions are found in numerous statements throughout court
decisions. For example, courts often proclaim that "[a] plaintiff can bring
a Title VII claim under either a disparate treatment theory or a disparate
impact theory." 153 The Supreme Court has articulated, "This Court has rec-
ognized that two forms of discrimination are prohibited under Title VII:
disparate treatment and disparate impact." '54
Concrete examples regarding the effects of the completeness assump-
tion are helpful. Courts have held, without much explanation, that an
individual plaintiff does not state a cognizable claim under the discrimina-
tion statutes if she alleges negligent discrimination but cannot meet the
152. See Noah D. Zatz, Managing the Macaw: Third-Party Harassers, Accommodation,
and the Disaggregation of Discriminatory Intent, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1357, 1368 (2009)
("Few propositions are less controversial or more embedded in the structure of Title VII analy-
sis than that the statute recognizes only 'disparate treatment' and 'disparate impact' theories
of employment discrimination." (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
153. Fuller v. Gen. Cable Indus., Inc., 81 F. Supp. 2d 726, 727 (E.D. Tex. 2000); Carpen-
ter v. Boeing Co., 456 F.3d 1183, 1186 (10th Cir. 2006).
154. Olmstead v. Zimring ex rel. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 617 n.2 (1999) (Thomas, J., dis-
senting); Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
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proof required under disparate impact.' When courts do so, the rationale
is often simple: individual disparate treatment cases require proof of in-
tent. 156
While it may be true that the Supreme Court has outlined a kind of
discrimination claim called disparate treatment and, at least in some in-
stances, has noted that such claims require intent, it does not follow that
the courts have considered whether negligent discrimination is cognizable.
Failure to consider the possibility of another "type" of discrimination is an
understandable mistake if one thinks that the enunciated tests represent a
complete articulation of the discrimination statutes' reach.
Such a failure is especially strange in the context of negligent discrim-
ination claims, because ideas of negligence abound within the accepted
discrimination frameworks. In Title VII disparate impact cases, a plaintiff
can prevail if she can show that the employer failed to adopt less discrimi-
natory alternatives. 57 In at least some instances, then, the employer may
be held liable for its negligence in failing to consider all of the possible
ways to make a certain kind of decision.'58 Further, if a coworker or a third
party harasses a plaintiff, the employer can be held liable for its negligence
in failing to remedy the harassment. 15 9 Because negligent discrimination has
not been systematized into a framework, however, courts remain reluctant to
fully consider whether such a claim can be brought under the discrimination
155. See, e.g., Aaron v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 3:08 CV 1471, 2009 WL 803586, at
*2 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 25, 2009) ("He also alleges Defendant was merely 'negligent' in its hiring
practices, which does not rise to the standard of intentional discrimination required by Title
VII" (citing St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1981))); Jalal v. Columbia
Univ., 4 F. Supp. 2d 224, 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) ("Perhaps Cole was negligent in not conducting
some sort of investigation when he was confronted with Harris' objection, innuendo though it
was. Title VII, however, provides no remedy for negligent discrimination (if such a thing is
possible): Only action taken with an intent to discriminate is prohibited." (citing Tex. Dep't of
Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981))); see generally Oppenheimer, supra note
94. It should be noted that courts do recognize employer liability for negligence where the
employer has failed to take action to prevent or correct harassment, but that liability depends
on a showing of harassment. See, e.g., Zarazed v. Spar Mgmt. Servs., Inc., No. Civ.A. 05-
2621, 2006 WL 224050, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 2006).
156. See, e.g., Aaron, 2009 WL 803586, at *2; Jalal, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 241. Evidence
suggests that plaintiffs' lawyers are reluctant to make negligence claims under Title VII. For
example, a defendant's memorandum stated:
Negligence is not a separate cause of action under Title VII. If it were, this cause of ac-
tion would be pled by some attorney in the United State. [sic] other than David Deratzian,
counsel for the Plaintiff. A Westlaw search concerning a cause of action for negligence
under Title VII reveals only lawsuits filed by Mr. Deratzian. While credit should be given
to Mr. Deratzian for creativity, such credit cannot be extended to create a bona fide cause
of action for Negligence under Title VII.
King v. Lehigh Univ., No. 06-4385, 2007 WL 211278, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 23, 2007) (altera-
tion in original).
157. Title VII § 703(k)(l)(A)(ii), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(ii) (2006).
158. Oppenheimer, supra note 94, at 932-33.
159. Pickett v. Sheridan Health Care Ctr., 610 F.3d 434, 441 (7th Cir. 2010); Zatz, supra
note 152, at 1371.
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statutes. Conceiving discrimination in this limited manner also causes courts
to reject, with little consideration, claims of structural discrimination and
unconscious discrimination, each of which at least arguably fits within the
broad statutory language of the federal discrimination statutes. 160
The same problem is presented when a plaintiff's facts arguably fit with-
in a recognized category of discrimination but do not fall neatly within one
of the rubrics associated with that category. For example, some courts ex-
plicitly hold that a plaintiff who alleges individual disparate treatment based
on a single motive must proceed through one of two methods: direct evi-
dence or McDonnell Douglas.16 1 Other courts list both methods for pursuing
individual disparate treatment claims without express words of limitation;
implicit within the list, however, is the impression that the courts view the
list as being complete. 162
If a case is based on circumstantial evidence and is brought by an indi-
vidual alleging a single motive, many courts will reflexively funnel that
inquiry through McDonnell Douglas. As discussed above, however, it is un-
clear why McDonnell Douglas is an appropriate test to use in all single motive
cases. Courts simply fail to consider that perhaps McDonnell Douglas's artic-
ulation of pretext does not represent a full account of discrimination where
circumstantial evidence is present.
As a result of the assumed completeness of the frameworks, courts may
dismiss claims that are arguably cognizable under the federal statutes.
Courts rarely acknowledge that they are operating under an assumption of
completeness, and their failure to do so can have negative consequences for
plaintiffs. In one case, a district court judge lamented that even though the
160. Hart, supra note 79, at 749 (noting that courts have discounted the possibility that
Title VII covers unconscious discrimination); McGinley, supra note 142, at 450. For further
description of structural discrimination, see Green, supra note 83, at 138 and Linda Hamilton
Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and
Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1231 (1995).
161. See, e.g., McCraven v. City of Chicago, 109 F. Supp. 2d 935, 941 (N.D. I11. 2000)
("The two methods of establishing disparate treatment discrimination are by direct evidence
(taking the form of 'I refused to hire you because of your race'), or by indirect evidence under
the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting approach." (citing Hasham v. Cal. State Bd. of
Equalization, 200 F.3d 1035, 1044 (7th Cir. 2000))); Jensvold v. Shalala, 925 E Supp. 1109,
1112-13 (D. Md. 1996) ("Plaintiff can satisfy her burden of proof through either direct proof
of discriminatory intent ... or through the indirect, burden-shifting method of proof set forth
in McDonnell Douglas." (citations omitted)), aff'd, 141 F.3d 1158 (4th Cir. 1998).
162. See, e.g., Egonmwan v. Cook Cnty. Sheriffs Dep't, 602 F.3d 845, 850 (7th Cir.
2010); Thompson v. Carrier Corp., 358 F. App'x 109, 111 (1 th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) ("A
plaintiff may establish a claim of discrimination under Title VII by direct or circumstantial
evidence, and when only the latter is relied on, we use the burden-shifting framework estab-
lished in [McDonnell Douglas] .... " (citations omitted)); Taylor v. Seton-Brackenridge
Hosp., 349 F App'x 874, 877 (5th Cir. 2009) ("Taylor has not provided direct evidence of
discrimination, therefore, his claim based on circumstantial evidence is analyzed under the bur-
den-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas." (citations omitted)). Some courts
allow claims to proceed through the direct framework if the plaintiff presents direct evidence of
discrimination or a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence. See Mach v. Will Cnty.
Sheriff, 580 F.3d 495, 499 (7th Cir. 2009).
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plaintiff might not have been considered equally for a job due to his race, he
was required to grant summary judgment for the employer under McDonnell
Douglas.'63 Unfortunately, the district court judge did not consider that per-
haps he was free under the broad statutory language of Title VII to at least
consider another interpretation of discrimination.
C. Courts Tend to Treat the Frameworks as Separate
Cognitive research suggests that placing items in different categories
causes people to overestimate differences between the items.' This is one
of the reasons why substantive discrimination happens. It is not surprising,
then, that when courts use frameworks, the separateness of those frame-
works creates or justifies differences that do not actually exist in the
statutory language or in discrimination theory. Often it seems as though the
courts view the frameworks as completely separate constructs, rather than as
parts of a unified whole.
Perhaps the most significant example of separateness can be found in
courts' insistence that disparate impact and disparate treatment claims differ
in fundamental ways. 165 For example, it is common for a court to assert that
no intent is required to establish a disparate impact claim, but that some sort
of intent (or at least internal causation) is required to establish a disparate
treatment claim. 16 6 The reasoning proceeds along the following lines: There
is one type of discrimination--disparate impact-that does not require in-
tent but that requires significant statistical disparities. There is another type
of discrimination-disparate treatment-that requires a showing of intent.
Therefore, the two types of discrimination are separate constructs that do
not blend into each other.
Indeed, some courts have gone so far as to state that the second portion
of Title VII's operative language relates to disparate impact, while the first
part relates to disparate treatment. 16 Such thinking is not required by the
163. Thomas v. Troy City Bd. of Educ., 302 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1309 (M.D. Ala. 2004).
164. See, e.g., Anne Locksley et al., Social Categorization and Discriminatory Behavior:
Extinguishing the Minimal Intergroup Discrimination Effect, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 773, 776-83 (1980); David A. Wilder, Perceiving Persons as a Group: Categoriza-
tion and Intergroup Relations, in COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN STEREOTYPING AND INTERGROUP
BEHAVIOR 213, 217 (David L. Hamilton ed., 1981).
165. E.g., Moore v. Boeing Co., No. 4:02CV80 CDP, 2004 WL 3202777, at *5 (E.D.
Mo. Mar. 31, 2004) ("[D]isparate treatment and disparate impact cases do differ fundamental-
ly. Disparate treatment occurs when a plaintiff is intentionally treated less favorably than
others because of her sex. Disparate impact, on the other hand, exists where an employment
practice, although neutral on its face, has a disproportionally negative effect on the plaintiff.");
Daniels v. Nationwide Ins., No. 99 C 757, 1999 WL 753945, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 1999)
("However, disparate treatment and disparate impact cases differ fundamentally."); see also
Zatz, supra note 152, at 1368-69 (noting that courts consider disparate impact and disparate
treatment to constitute exclusive claims, although they may be plead together or in the alterna-
tive).
166. The term "internal causation" is used in Zatz, supra note 152.
167. See, e.g., Stagi v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 391 F. App'x 133, 136 (3d Cir. 2010).
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operative language of the federal employment discrimination statutes, but
flows from the ways in which the courts tend to think about discrimination
frameworks. Rather than provide a principled discussion regarding whether
nonintent cases can exist outside of the disparate impact formula, the courts
simply resort to the idea that disparate impact and disparate treatment are
separate constructs. 168
Many courts also have held that pattern or practice claims must be
brought in the form of class actions. 69 There is little persuasive reasoning
given for this distinction, other than the fact that pattern or practice claims
are, by their nature, group claims. While the name of this category of claims
may suggest a distinction, there is nothing within Title VII's statutory lan-
guage that requires private plaintiffs to bring pattern or practice claims
through the class action mechanism.
The belief that the frameworks justify separate analysis has caused mas-
sive confusion in the consideration of single- and mixed-motive
frameworks. McDonnell Douglas developed as a single-motive framework
that does not work well in mixed-motive contexts, because it focuses on the
reason for a particular action. 70 When mixed motives became an issue under
Title VII, the Supreme Court developed a separate framework for consider-
ing mixed-motive claims, and some lower courts then began to sharply
divide between the available options: either a claim had to pushed into a
single-motive framework or into a mixed-motive framework. 7 ' Although
plaintiffs were allowed to plead claims in the alternative, some courts
viewed the single-motive inquiry as fundamentally different from the
mixed-motive inquiry, requiring different proof structures and different ide-
as about the required amount of causation. 172 Unfortunately, courts have
never adequately examined whether such differences should exist or wheth-
er they continue to exist merely because they are products of the ways in
which courts organize discrimination claims.
168. See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (holding that
plaintiffs could prevail only if they established a specific practice leading to a disparate im-
pact); Allen v. Highlands Hosp. Corp., 545 F.3d 387 (6th Cir. 2008) (refusing to allow
plaintiffs to proceed on disparate impact claim based on age because they failed to meet dis-
parate impact test, even though deposition testimony suggested that employer was targeting
employees with more seniority for termination).
169. Celestine v. Petroleos de Venez. SA, 266 E3d 343,355-56(5th Cir. 2001).
170. See Steven J. Kaminshine, Disparate Treatment as a Theory of Discrimination: The
Need for a Restatement, Not a Revolution, 2 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 41 (2005). There is an
interesting scholarly debate regarding whether the McDonnell Douglas test requires a showing
of but-for or motivating factor causation. See Zimmer, supra note 140, at 1288-89. By indicat-
ing that McDonnell Douglas often funnels discrimination inquiries into consideration of the
reason for a decision, this Article does not express a viewpoint on this debate but rather notes
the practical effects of the test.
171. See, e.g., Diamond v. Colonial Life &Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 318 (4th Cir.
2005).
172. See Martin J. Katz, Unifying Disparate Treatment (Really), 59 HASTINGS L.J. 643,
655 (2008) [hereinafter Katz, Disparate Treatment].
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Many courts further divide single-motive, individual disparate treatment
claims into separate rubrics for direct evidence and circumstantial evidence,
even though this distinction has been flatly rejected in mixed-motive cases
and even though courts have had difficulty defining when evidence is direct
and when it is circumstantial.1 73
Further, there is no proof structure that crosses discrimination types. If a
plaintiff has a claim that relies on combined theories of disparate impact,
disparate treatment, and harassment, but is unable to meet at least one of the
individual rubrics, her claim will be dismissed.
When courts combine the idea of separateness with the assumption of
completeness, strange consequences result. Consider the following two ex-
amples.
As discussed earlier, courts tend to view disparate treatment claims as re-
quiring intent. Therefore, all claims where the plaintiff has no evidence of
intent must be funneled through the disparate impact rubric. 174 This kind of
analysis is strange because the rubrics the courts use to resolve disparate im-
pact cases cover only a small subset of so-called "nonintentional
discrimination" cases-those in which the plaintiff can establish that a specif-
ic practice caused a statistical disparity. But the statutory language suggests
that plaintiffs should be able to prevail on a nonintentional discrimination
claim in other ways. Plaintiffs affected by structural discrimination should be
able to testify that employment policies affected them and their coworkers in
certain ways, even in cases where it is impossible to develop a statistical
case.175 Additionally, if a plaintiff's evidence is not based solely on statistics, it
is difficult to understand why a specific practice requirement should come into
play. In other words, plaintiffs should be able to try to establish that many
multiple practices combine to create an outcome. Further, under the current
frameworks, it is not clear how a plaintiff would proceed if she wanted to pur-
sue a claim based on both unintentional and intentional conduct. There is
currently no existing framework for undertaking this analysis.
Also consider the delineation of harassment from individual disparate
treatment cases. As courts modified the McDonnell Douglas test, they began
to require that the plaintiff establish that she suffered an adverse action as
part of her prima facie case. 17 6 In practice, this distinction means that a
173. See, e.g., Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 284-86 (4th
Cir. 2004) (applying McDonnell Douglas test for single-motive cases and different framework
for mixed-motive cases); Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 852-54 (9th Cir. 2002)
(describing disarray in court descriptions of direct and circumstantial evidence), aff'd, 539
U.S. 90 (2003).
174. See, e.g., Frazier v. Garrison I.S.D., 980 F.2d 1514, 1522-23 (5th Cir. 1993).
175. This might occur, for example, when the workplace is too small to create statistical-
ly significant disparities or where there are too few workers in the protected class.
176. See, e.g., St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-09 (1993); Cooper v.
United Parcel Serv., Inc., 368 E App'x 469, 473-74 (5th Cir. 2010) (indicating that lateral
transfer is not cognizable); Leftwich v. U.S. Steel Corp., 470 F. Supp. 758, 764 (W.D. Pa.
1979). A minority of circuits use the term "ultimate employment action" to define the required
level of seriousness. An "ultimate employment action" is stricter than an "adverse action" and
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plaintiff often is not able to prove a disparate treatment claim for certain
types of conduct that do not meet this legal standard, such as certain types of
lateral transfers and negative evaluations. By default, these cases are often
forced into a harassment framework, which relies on the severe or pervasive
rubric, rather than on a rubric that focuses on adverse employment action.
But it is not clear that the harassment framework is the right framework for
dealing with this type of conduct, which likely affects the terms or condi-
tions of a person's employment without being either severe or pervasive.
1 77
These ideas of separateness and completeness become further enshrined
in employment discrimination doctrine when courts begin to develop short-
hand for discussing the frameworks. Like many abbreviations, the shorthand
descriptions of frameworks lack certain nuances and may introduce assump-
tions that were not present in the original cases from which the framework is
derived. Sometimes the shorthand contains actual mistakes, and as the
shorthand version is repeated, the mistakes become the norm. While these
abbreviated descriptions are important for efficient operation of courts, they
may improperly distort discrimination concepts.
Examples of these abbreviated descriptions are compelling. Some courts
have asserted that there are two ways to prove discrimination: disparate
treatment, which requires a showing of intent, and disparate impact, which
does not.'7 8 Within this statement are powerful assumptions about the sepa-
rateness of disparate impact and disparate treatment and about the intent
required to prove an individual case when gross statistical disparities are not
present. While this language has been repeated in hundreds of cases, it is
unclear whether it is a correct statement of the law.
After the Supreme Court established the McDonnell Douglas test, courts
began describing the circumstances in which it should be used. The Su-
preme Court has never held that the test is the only way of establishing
discrimination claims with circumstantial evidence. Yet, in describing when
to use the three-part burden-shifting framework, courts began to transform
McDonnell Douglas from a way of proving such claims into the way of
proving them. 17 9
requires an action such as a failure to hire, a discharge, a failure to promote, or a compensa-
tion decision. See, e.g., Lee v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 247 E App'x 472, 477 (5th Cir. 2007)
(per curiam).
177. The same problem appears in cases where the facts show that a plaintiff was dis-
criminated against and the discrimination continued after she filed her complaint. Courts have
difficulty deciding whether postcomplaint evidence falls within the discrimination or the retal-
iation rubric. See generally Jain, supra note 127.
178. See, e.g., Sanders v. Hughes Aircraft Co., No. 87-5925, 1988 WL 25468, at *2 (9th
Cir. Mar. 17, 1988) ("There are two ways a plaintiff may prove race discrimination: disparate
treatment and disparate impact."); Ladd v. Boeing Co., No. 06-28, 2008 WL 375725, at *10
(E.D. Pa. Feb. 8, 2008) (same).
179. See, e.g., McCraven v. City of Chicago, 109 F. Supp. 2d 935, 941 (N.D. I11. 2000)
("The two methods of establishing disparate treatment discrimination are by direct evidence
(taking the form of 'I refused to hire you because of your race'), or by indirect evidence under
the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting approach."); Jensvold v. Shalala, 925 F. Supp. 1109,
1112-13 (D. Md. 1996) ("Plaintiff can satisfy her burden of proof through either direct proof
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Treating the discrimination frameworks as separate is strange because
most of the types of discrimination were conceived from Title VII's original
language.18 0 Further, none of the types of discrimination were explicitly
mentioned in that original language. Recall that none of the statutes explicit-
ly mention individual disparate treatment or harassment, or use the words
"single motive" or "mixed motive." Until 1991, Title VII did not contain the
words "disparate impact," and neither the ADEA nor the ADA uses the ter-
minology.181 McDonnell Douglas is not codified in any statutory language.
Nonetheless, using frameworks to think about discrimination causes courts
to forget that much of discrimination law's structure and terminology is a
judicial gloss; one that is not necessarily required by the underlying statuto-
ry regimes.
IV. OTHER CONSEQUENCES OF REFLEXIVE RELIANCE ON FRAMEWORKS
The preceding Parts demonstrate how the frameworks squeeze out
claims that are arguably cognizable under the federal discrimination stat-
utes' broad operative language. This Part discusses other important
consequences that flow from this typology. First, the contours of discrimina-
tion law become defined by path dependence, rather than through direct
reasoning. Second, frameworks create theoretical, doctrinal, and procedural
confusion.
A. Courts and Litigants Use Path-Dependent Reasoning
of the Frameworks Rather than Direct Reasoning
After a framework is created, courts often funnel their discrimination in-
quiries through this typology, rather than through the statutory language.
Like the prisoners in the allegory of the cave, courts (and litigants) begin to
review discrimination based on a shadow of reality. They become focused
on discerning the nuances of the shadows without recognizing that the ty-
pology may not fully or accurately capture the statutory language. While the
courts appear to vigorously analyze discrimination, they often just tease out
the intricacies of the frameworks, leaving discrimination's central questions
unexplored. At the same time, it often appears as though the courts have
of discriminatory intent ... or through the indirect, burden-shifting method of proof set forth
in McDonnell Douglas." (citations omitted))
180. Title VII § 703(a)(1)-(2), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l)-(2) (2006). It is possible to
argue that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) is the statutory provision relating to disparate treatment,
while disparate impact derives from the separate protections under § 2000e-2(a)(2). E.g., L.
Camille Hbert, The Disparate Impact of Sexual Harassment: Does Motive Matter?, 53 U.
KAN. L. REV. 341, 346 n.18 (2005) (noting that courts have traditionally identified disparate
impact and disparate treatment as stemming from different provisions). There is nothing in the
statutory language of Title VII, however, that confines either type of discrimination to (a)(l) or
(a)(2).
181. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act § 4(a), 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2006);
Americans with Disabilities Act § 102(a)-(b), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)-(b).
October 2011 ]
Michigan Law Review
addressed these central questions. The following discussion illustrates this
problem.
Courts tend to consider disparate impact and disparate treatment as dis-
tinct kinds of discrimination.' 82 Although disparate impact does not require
a showing of intent, it does require a specific kind of evidence to make a
claim, a statistically significant disparity. 183 Disparate treatment cases, in
contrast, require a showing of intent. By default, this dichotomy necessarily
excludes unconscious bias and negligent discrimination actions that do not
create gross statistical disparities based on a protected class. And, because
disparate impact and disparate treatment are separate types of discrimina-
tion, it is difficult for courts to consider structural discrimination, which may
result as a mixture of unconscious, negligent, and intentional acts.
The exclusion of structural discrimination, negligent discrimination, and
unconscious bias from disparate impact and disparate treatment claims de-
rives from the framework mindset, not explicit reasoning. When the
Supreme Court first considered disparate impact claims in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., gross statistical disparities existed on the facts of the case before
it.184 As a result of factual capture, these gross statistical disparities'85 be-
came one of the defining features of a new type of discrimination the Court
defined as disparate impact discrimination, and Congress later codified this
distinction in Title VII. 186 Both the district court and the appellate court in
Griggs emphasized that the plaintiffs did not have evidence of intentional
discrimination, and this condition also became part of the disparate impact
narrative.'87
In later cases, the Supreme Court grafted the specific practice require-
ment onto disparate impact cases. 188 But the Court first added this
requirement in a plurality opinion, in which the implications of requiring a
specific practice were not fully briefed by the parties and where the absence
of a specific practice requirement was not the primary source of confusion
among the lower courts. 89 When the courts began to form a shorthand for
182. Lewis v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 2191, 2199 (2010); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank
& Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986-987 (1988) (plurality opinion).
183. Waisome v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 948 F.2d 1370, 1376 (2d Cir. 1991).
184. 401 U.S. 424,430(1971).
185. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430 n.6 (noting that while 34% of white males had completed
high school, only 12% of black males had done so and that 58% of whites passed the stand-
ardized tests, in contrast to only 6% of black candidates).
186. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k).
187. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 428.
188. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
189. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988) (plurality opinion).
Congress eventually codified the disparate impact inquiry in Title VII, but modified the court-
created framework. Title VII § 703(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2006). This framework is now
part of the statute, and courts are required to use it. This does not mean, however, that the
framework was well-conceived in the first place or that it describes the only avenue for plain-
tiffs to establish nonintentional discrimination claims. See Section V.C for further discussion
of this issue.
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conceptualizing disparate impact claims, they emphasized three items: (1)
that disparate impact is separate from disparate treatment; (2) that disparate
impact claims do not require intent, unlike disparate treatment claims; and
(3) that the plaintiff is required to pinpoint a specific practice that creates the
disparate impact.
Courts began to rely on the fact that disparate impact and disparate
treatment are different types of discrimination to justify the separateness of
both the underlying theory and the doctrinal structures. Yet the Supreme
Court has never adequately explained why disparate treatment requires a
showing of intent or why claims that do not rely on intent should always be
funneled through the disparate impact inquiry.
The dichotomy between an intentional type of discrimination and a non-
intentional one might be less problematic if the courts did not also tend to
view the current frameworks as complete. When lower courts look at a prob-
lem that does not fit neatly within one of the established frameworks, they
tend to view such claims as noncognizable and fail to consider that perhaps
the courts simply have not addressed the issue.
Distinguishing disparate impact and disparate treatment may have been
helpful in the early disparate impact cases and may still offer an efficient
way to think of some factual scenarios that give rise to discrimination. In
many instances, however, the frameworks prevent courts from fully theoriz-
ing and conceptualizing discrimination. Consider the cases discussed in Part
III, in which adherence to frameworks may cause courts to ignore the larger
question of discrimination.
Indeed, it is often hard to determine why courts do not recognize negli-
gent discrimination or unconscious discrimination claims or why they have
difficulty with structural discrimination. There are few well-reasoned opin-
ions examining the federal employment discrimination statutes' language,
legislative history, or underlying purposes with respect to these types of
claims. Note that this Article does not make any normative claims regarding
whether these kinds of discrimination should be cognizable. Rather, it
claims that statutory language requires courts to directly consider the viabil-
ity of these forms of discrimination, and the courts' discussion of these
issues would be useful in understanding the contours of discrimination.
Path dependence also explains constrained thinking about how intent is
manifested. After McDonnell Douglas, three important ideas came to the
fore. First, courts began to articulate that circumstantial evidence of discrim-
ination should be considered with different structures than cases presenting
direct evidence. This distinction survives in the single-motive context, even
though Supreme Court has specifically rejected it in mixed-motive cases19°
and even though the courts have had great difficulty defining direct and cir-
cumstantial evidence. Second, the primary inquiry in circumstantial
evidence cases is one of pretext. And finally, McDonnell Douglas framed
190. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98-99 (2003) (indicating that direct
evidence is not required to assert mixed motive under Title VII because the statute does not
make a distinction between circumstantial and direct evidence).
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intent in a way that focused on finding a single reason for a discriminatory
decision. Importantly, none of these turns was required by the underlying
case. Rather, the Court could have simply indicated that in some cases a
plaintiff may prevail by establishing pretext. Nonetheless, the Court chose to
conceptualize disparate treatment through the use of a framework.
After McDonnell Douglas, individual disparate treatment cases based on
circumstantial evidence are severed from other disparate treatment cases and
from discrimination law as a whole. Indeed, the current confusion over
whether McDonnell Douglas survived the 1991 amendments to Title VII can
be blamed, at least in part, on the courts' determination to keep McDonnell
Douglas as a separate way of thinking about a specific kind of discrimina-
tion. Many circuits developed a shorthand that erroneously characterized
McDonnell Douglas as the only way to think about single-motive discrimi-
nation claims based on circumstantial evidence.
The continued use of McDonnell Douglas disguises the fact that many
important questions in employment discrimination law remain unanswered.
These questions include whether there is an actual difference between direct
and circumstantial evidence, how intent should be defined, and whether the
creation of a rebuttable presumption makes sense given the contours of the
modem workplace. Further, by funneling cases through the accepted test-a
test that does not fully capture all possible discrimination-a court can easi-
ly disregard other possible ways of showing discrimination.
Reasoning by path dependence is not confined to these two areas of em-
ployment discrimination law; however, they provide good examples of how
the frameworks operate to distract courts from directly addressing important
questions.
This path dependence is especially troubling because it has effects out-
side of the courtroom. Many practicing lawyers also view discrimination
through the frameworks, either because they have a formalistic view of the
law that situates the frameworks as the definition of discrimination or be-
cause they believe it is futile or too costly to litigate against them.19" ' When
litigants begin to frame their discrimination complaints, they do so within
the accepted discrimination frameworks. And when employers consider
whether their employment practices are discriminatory, the case law serves
as a tool for making such assessments.'92 Even when lawyers or employers
see inequality in the workplaces based on protected traits, they may find it
difficult to conceptualize why these inequalities would be discriminatory if
they fall outside of traditional frameworks. A recent Westlaw search con-
191. Age Discrimination in Massachusetts, CUSHNER & BLOOM, P.C., http://
www.cushnerbloom.com/age.htm (last visited May 8, 2011) (indicating that a plaintiff must
present direct evidence of discrimination or proceed through the McDonnell Douglas frame-
work to prove claims).
192. See, e.g., Employer Notes, FROST, BROWN, TODD, LLC, http://fbtemployerlaw.com/
age-discrimination-claim-dismissed (last visited May 23, 2011) (discussing recent case in
which ADEA case was dismissed because of plaintiff's failure to establish replacement out-
side his class). This is not to suggest that employers do not at times reach beyond that
typology in thinking about discrimination practices in the workplace.
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firms little discussion of negligent discrimination in Title VII cases. A sepa-
rate search shows almost no discussion of structural discrimination in
reported cases.
If the courts are not addressing the fundamental questions of employ-
ment discrimination, what are they doing? After all, there has been a huge
number of Supreme Court cases addressing discrimination law over the past
several decades. Since the 1970s, many of Supreme Court employment dis-
crimination cases have centered on the meaning of the frameworks. And two
of the 1991 amendments to Title VII were reactions to frameworks.
Think again about the history of employment discrimination law in Sec-
tion I.A. The Supreme Court created the McDonnell Douglas test. In Texas
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,193 St. Mary's Honor Center v.
Hicks,194 O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp.,1 95 and Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.,9 6 the Court explained how the test op-
erated. The Court later considered mixed-motive claims in Price Waterhouse
v. Hopkins. Because McDonnell Douglas was conceived in a single-motive
context, the Court created another test to think about mixed-motive claims.
Congress responded to the test by amending Title VII. Because the Court cre-
ated a nonstatutory distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence in
the individual disparate treatment, single-motive context, the Supreme Court
in Desert Palace was required to consider whether the distinction exists in the
mixed-motive context.' 97 The separation of mixed-motive and single-motive
claims has raised many questions, such as how and when to distinguish sin-
gle- and mixed-motive claims, the nature of the pleading requirements for
single- and mixed-motive claims, and whether the motivating factor language
in the mixed-motive context can be used in the single-motive context.
Within the past decade, the frameworks have caused even more prob-
lems, as the federal courts have begun to distinguish the structures under
Title VII, the ADEA, and to a lesser extent, the ADA. Today, separate struc-
tures exist for disparate impact claims under Title VII and the ADEA. 98
Mixed-motive claims are recognized under Title VII but not under the
ADEA.199 It is unclear whether the McDonnell Douglas test should be used
in ADEA cases.200 In many of the instances where the courts have interpret-
ed Title VII and the ADEA differently, it remains unclear whether the ADA
will follow a Title VII model, an ADEA model, or yet another model.
193. 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
194. 509 U.S. 502, 507 (1993).
195. 517 U.S. 308, 310-12 (1996).
196. 530 U.S. 133, 142-43 (2000).
197. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 100 (2003).
198. See Title VII § 703(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2006); Smith v. City of Jackson,
544 U.S. 228, 253 (2005) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
199. See Title VII § 703(m), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m); Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129
S. Ct. 2343, 2351 (2009).
200. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2349 n.2.
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These differentiations are not entirely due to differences in the various
statutes. Rather, the differences can, in part, be explained as a response to
proof structures. In explaining that mixed-motive claims are not cognizable
under the ADEA, Justice Thomas expressed skepticism about the Price Wa-
terhouse test and noted the endless confusion created by the frameworks.
20 1
What is most unfortunate about the history of federal employment dis-
crimination law is how much effort has been diverted from more important
inquiries and wasted on frameworks. Imagine, for example, if the Court in
McDonnell Douglas had simply indicated that pretext was a way of estab-
lishing discrimination, without the attendant three-part burden-shifting test.
The decade of confusion that resulted in Burdine and Hicks would have been
saved, the direct/circumstantial evidence dichotomy may have been avoided,
a broader conception of intent would be possible, and the courts may not
have felt compelled to create different tests for single- and mixed-motive
claims or to even use the terminology in the first place. And the efforts
placed on all of those issues could have been used to answer more funda-
mental questions about discrimination.
One of the central aims of this Article is to re-establish rigor in the way
that courts conceive of and analyze discrimination claims. To do this, courts
must examine how much of their thinking about discrimination is driven by
its organizational model and how much is actually required by the statutes.
B. The Frameworks Create Doctrinal, Theoretical,
and Procedural Confusion
Conceiving discrimination through frameworks also makes courts inat-
tentive to the field as a theoretical, doctrinal, and procedural whole. Many of
the inconsistencies within the field can be traced to this pattern of thinking.
This Section first considers how the frameworks create disunity in discrimi-
nation law's theory and doctrine and then discusses procedural problems
with the frameworks.
The division between disparate impact and disparate treatment provides
an example of the way in which the frameworks create confusion. In adopt-
ing disparate impact, the Supreme Court recognized that societal
discrimination that occurs outside the workplace could find its way into the
workplace through company policies and procedures. In Griggs, for exam-
ple, the Court held that a high school graduation requirement and a written
testing requirement unrelated to the job were discriminatory because mem-
bers of different races had different educational opportunities. 2" Thus,
disparate impact claims rely, at least in part, on a theory of substantive
equality.
In contrast, disparate treatment claims are largely conceived as based in
formal equality: individuals are to be treated the same without regard to their
201. Id. at 2346; see also Katz, Gross Disunity, supra note 2, at 878 (discussing how the
Supreme Court's decision in Gross may be, in part, a shift away from proof structures)
202. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432-33 (1971).
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protected traits. In the disparate treatment context, courts have broadly defined
what constitutes a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for employment ac-
tions. Courts largely defer to the business judgment of employers in enacting
job standards, even when those standards might have varying effects on dif-
ferent protected classes, as long as the standards were not implemented to
disadvantage any particular protected class.
Whether substantive equality can or should be a basis for claims outside
the traditional disparate impact proof structure is an interesting question that
federal courts have never fully or significantly addressed. Rather than facing
this difficult question, the courts have avoided the issue by using the frame-
works, which do not require the courts to consider the issue explicitly.
Because only disparate impact claims focus on substantive equality, because
disparate treatment claims differ from disparate impact claims, and because
disparate treatment requires intent, courts fail to consider whether substan-
tive equality can also be a basis for disparate treatment claims. Further,
because the courts presume the completeness of the existing frameworks,
they do not endeavor to conceive of a potential third category: a claim
grounded in substantive equality that does not rely on proof of specific prac-
tices causing gross statistical disparities. 203
What is strange about this theoretical inconsistency is that disparate
treatment and disparate impact were originally conceived from the same
operative provisions. If substantive equality is an appropriate basis for dis-
parate impact claims, then there is at least a possibility that it is an
appropriate basis for disparate treatment claims. And, if the reach of sub-
stantive equality should be limited to disparate impact claims, the courts
need to engage in serious consideration of the issue directly
Another source of tension appears with negligent discrimination. The
Supreme Court has not defined negligent discrimination as a particular
"type" of discrimination. Yet, the idea of negligence abounds within har-
assment doctrine. Employers are held liable for their own negligence when a
coworker or third party harasses a plaintiff.2" Employers can escape liability
for supervisory harassment that does not result in a tangible employment
action if the employer has taken reasonable steps to avoid or prevent the
harassment. 20 5 Again, this Article does not argue that negligent discrimina-
tion claims should be cognizable. Rather, it argues that where the courts use
a particular theoretical model to consider one type of discrimination, they
should also consider whether this model can be used in other types. In other
words, if negligence principles are used in some discrimination contexts, the
203. For example, plaintiffs might proceed on proof that several smaller practices that
individually did not create a statistical disparity combined to create a statistical disparity,
plaintiffs might create (without statistics) a convincing causal narrative suggesting that plain-
tiffs reasonably perceived facially nondiscriminatory practices as limiting employment
opportunities, or the courts might declare that some policies inherently limit or tend to limit
the employment opportunities based on a protected trait, such as leave policies that would not
plausibly allow a woman to take time off to have a child.
204. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 776 (1998).
205. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
October 2011 ]
Michigan Law Review
courts should explicitly determine whether a claim for negligent discrimina-
tion is cognizable.
The frameworks also lead to doctrinal confusion. Consider the existing
dichotomy of direct and circumstantial evidence in single-motive disparate
treatment cases. In the mixed-motive context, the Supreme Court has held
that the dichotomy does not exist, because the 1991 amendments to Title VII
do not draw a distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence. 06 No-
tably, the original operative language of Title VII also makes no distinction
between direct and circumstantial evidence, yet the dichotomy remains for
single-motive cases because of reliance on the old frameworks.
Further consider the endless questions that continue to plague courts re-
garding the continuing viability of McDonnell Douglas, its application in
other contexts, and the appropriate causal or intent standard for proving in-
dividual disparate treatment claims. Important issues-such as whether the
causal standard that Congress added to Title VII in the 1991 amendments is
a normatively better standard than the ones created by the courts-have not
been resolved.20 7 Because of dependence on frameworks, however, these
questions remain largely unanswered or answered only by default reasoning.
The frameworks also create procedural confusion. The terms "types,"
"categories," "rubrics," and "frameworks" have been used throughout this
Article to avoid connecting these terms with procedural terms of art. How-
ever, many difficult questions that arise in employment discrimination cases
exist because the courts have been unable to fully and consistently map the
frameworks onto accepted procedural concepts.
This first source of confusion arises with the types or categories of dis-
crimination. It remains unclear whether the types of discrimination are
separate "claims" under the statutes or whether they are simply ways of
clarifying the statutes' primary operative language. This distinction has im-
portant consequences for pleading and for later appellate review of whether
a plaintiff raised a particular claim. Courts routinely refer to the types of
discrimination as claims, but it is not clear that they use the term in its pro-
cedural sense. 208
Consider a plaintiff whose complaint provides that she was not hired for
a position with a certain company because of her gender. If her claim is con-
ceived broadly as a Title VII claim, she may be able to develop a case under
both disparate treatment and disparate impact theories. If, however, courts
conceive of disparate treatment and disparate impact as separate legal
claims, the court may require more specific pleading regarding each claim in
the complaint. As the federal courts heighten pleading requirements, it be-
206. Desert Palace Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98-101 (2003).
207. See Katz, Disparate Treatment, supra note 172, at 644 (arguing that the best
framework under current law is the 1991 Title VII framework).
208. See, e.g., Lewis v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 2191, 2198 (2010).
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comes increasingly important whether types of discrimination represent
separate claims.
20 9
In the individual disparate treatment context, a second source of confu-
sion exists because it not completely clear whether the term "mixed motive"
describes a type of discrimination, a rubric for evaluating a discrimination
claim, or perhaps both. If mixed motive under Title VII is both a type of
discrimination and a way of describing the analysis performed under the
1991 amendments, then a plaintiff who proceeds on a disparate treatment
claim arguably must plead whether she is proceeding under a single or
mixed motive (or plead in the alternative). If the plaintiff only cites the pri-
mary operative provisions of Title VII but does not otherwise plead mixed
motive, then the court may dismiss any later assertion of mixed motive. A
court evaluating a case on summary judgment might refuse to apply a
mixed-motive framework to cases in which the plaintiff alleges a single mo-
tive and might later refuse to issue jury instructions on mixed motive.
Whether mixed motive is a claim or a way of analyzing a claim also is
important because it determines whether plaintiffs who proceed under sin-
gle-motive cases can use the broader "motivating factor" language provided
in the 1991 amendments at both the summary judgment stage and in jury
instructions." 0 This issue also raises profound issues regarding whether
McDonnell Douglas survives as a stand-alone analytical structure and
whether the direct/circumstantial evidence dichotomy is still appropriate in
single-motive cases.
A third source of procedural confusion relates to whether the structures
used to evaluate cases represent the elements of causes of actions or whether
they are simply ways for the courts to organize evidence. The confusion is
best illustrated by considering McDonnell Douglas. Courts often refer to
McDonnell Douglas as providing the "elements" of a discrimination claim
based on circumstantial evidence,"' and many courts use the test as the
standard through which they consider summary judgment motions.21 2 Yet the
Supreme Court has reiterated that the McDonnell Douglas test is merely an
evidentiary framework to aid courts in sifting through evidence2 1 3 and has
held that it is not necessary for a plaintiff to plead its factors in a com-
plaint.2 4 Further, many courts refuse to instruct juries on McDonnell
209. In Title VII cases, this issue is even more complex. The concepts of disparate im-
pact and mixed motive were originally created as interpretations of Title VII's primary
operative language. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241-43 (1989); Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-32 (1971). However, Congress amended Title VII to
include separate provisions for disparate impact and mixed motive. Title VII § 703(k) & (m),
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) & (m) (2006). It is not clear from these codifications whether dispar-
ate impact and mixed motive still fall within the primary operative language of Title VII or
whether Congress codified separate claims.
210. Title VII § 703(m), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
211. E.g., Sydney v. ConMed Elec. Surgery, 275 F. App'x 748, 751 (10th Cir. 2008).
212. See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 584 (2007).
213. O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 311 (1996).
214. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002).
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Douglas if a case reaches trial. 15 To the extent that McDonnell Douglas
imposes different requirements on parties than they would be required to
prove at trial, its use as a summary judgment standard appears problematic
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), which provides that summary
judgment should be granted when the movant has shown that he or she
would be entitled to judgment as a matter of law.216 Under Rule 50, the
standard for granting judgment as a matter of law is whether a reasonable
jury could find in favor of the movant on a particular issue. 217 To the extent
that McDonnell Douglas directs a court to consider issues that are different
than the ones a jury would consider, it is procedurally problematic.
Under the current ways that courts think about discrimination, it is likely
that some of the rubrics will be categorized as "elements," while others will
not be so labeled. As discussed above, characterizing McDonnell Douglas as
the elements of a claim seems suspect. It is more plausible for courts to con-
ceptualize the disparate impact framework contained in Title VII and the
court-created disparate impact framework in ADEA as elements of such
claims, because it appears that the courts conceive these tests as providing
the only way to approach such claims. While these conclusions are plausi-
ble, Section V.A discusses a better way to conceive of the frameworks that
provides broader cohesion within federal employment discrimination law.
Questions about how the types and frameworks fit into the procedural
classifications in civil procedure will become more important as federal
courts strengthen the pleading requirements. This issue is also important
because thinking about the types and frameworks as claims and elements
increases the tendency to think of them as separate from one another, rather
than as parts of a unified statutory scheme.
The doctrinal, theoretical, and procedural confusion discussed in this
Section not only is distressing from an intellectual standpoint, but, just as
importantly, has real world consequences. As discussed throughout this Ar-
ticle, the circuit courts and the Supreme Court have been resolving problems
with the frameworks for decades. Behind these cases are real plaintiffs and
defendants. The confusion creates an uncertainty that makes it difficult for
parties to determine potential liability both ex post and ex ante. The parties
spend much time and effort litigating the frameworks, rather than the actual
case, which causes many cases to devolve into gamesmanship. As one
scholar noted, "[S]uch a state of affairs breeds cynicism about the law in this
215. E.g., Whittington, Sr. v. Nordam Grp. Inc., 429 F.3d 986, 997-98 (10th Cir. 2005)
(asserting that the McDonnell Douglas framework increases chances of jury error because of
its complexity); Williams v. Eau Claire Pub. Schs., 397 F.3d 441, 446 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding
that the McDonnell Douglas framework may, but need not, be incorporated into jury instruc-
tions); Kanida v. Gulf Coast Med. Pers. LP, 363 F.3d 568, 576 (5th Cir. 2004) ("This Court
has consistently held that district courts should not frame jury instructions based upon the
intricacies of the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis.").
216. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
217. FED. R. Civ. P 50.
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area, as it suggests that outcomes depend more on technicalities than on the
merits of a particular case.' '21
V. VISUALIZING THE CHANGED LANDSCAPE
This Part shows how abandoning the frameworks would alter the field.
It addresses the core objections to change, ultimately concluding that
many of these objections are either unsupported by evidence or exaggerat-
ed, and that the true costs of abandoning the typology are outweighed by
the benefits to be gained.
A. A Return to First Principles
The proposed solution to the problems caused by the frameworks is
simple: the courts should reduce the categories to mere labels and abandon
most, if not all, all of the current frameworks. In their place, the courts
should return to first principles, fashioning the elements of employment dis-
crimination claims with careful regard to the breadth of the actual statutory
language. This Section carefully lays out that solution.
The elements of a discrimination claim under Title VII's statutory lan-
guage would require proof of (1) hiring, termination, compensation
decisions, or other actions that affect the terms or conditions of employment
or that limit a plaintiff's employment opportunities that are (2) taken be-
cause of (3) a protected trait. In some cases, no further explanation will be
needed, and courts and litigants can focus on these key questions.211 Indeed,
this is the iteration courts use to explain how they approach direct evidence
cases.
220
Take again the hypothetical raised in Part II regarding the woman who
faces harassment in the workplace, where employment policies are thought-
lessly crafted, and where the plaintiff may have been evaluated differently
based on her gender. Whether this case gets to trial depends on how the
court structures its inquiry.
Using a broad, statutory inquiry, a court would ask whether, looking at
the facts as a whole, a reasonable jury could conclude that the plaintiff was
discriminated against in the terms, conditions, or privileges of her employ-
ment based on her gender; or whether the employer limited its employees in
any way that would deprive or tend to deprive them of employment oppor-
tunities or would otherwise adversely affect their status as employees, based
on a protected trait. Note that this inquiry would consider both portions of
Title VII's main operative provisions, rather than separately viewing 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) as governing disparate treatment and § 2000e-
2(a)(2) as governing disparate impact.
218. Katz, Disparate Treatment, supra note 172, at 644.
219. Retaliation and accommodation cases may require a separate set of elements when
they derive from different statutory provisions than pure discrimination claims.
220. See, e.g., Delap v. Federal-Mogul Powertrain, Inc., No. 3:09-CV-73 CAN, 2010 WL
1541359, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 15, 2010).
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In other cases, litigants or courts may need further guidance on how to
legally define the elements of the discrimination claim in light of the partic-
ular facts of the case. For example, McDonnell Douglas's core holding-
that discrimination can be shown by establishing that the employer lied
about the reason for its decision--could be an important supporting doctrine
in some cases. By focusing on the essential elements of a claim first, how-
ever, the courts would not become mired in a pretext inquiry in cases where
such an inquiry is not helpful.
Further, this proposed inquiry is similar to the inquiry courts undertake
in many other contexts. Negligence cases are generally described through
basic elements, as are many other statutory causes of action.22 At times, the
elements alone are enough to assist a court in resolving a case. At other
times, supporting doctrines are used. But the negligence inquiry is not hi-
jacked by the nuances of the supporting doctrine in every case.
To the extent that the frameworks are helpful in resolving a case, they
can be placed within the general elements. For example, the idea that dis-
parate impact allows causation through gross statistical disparities can be
grafted onto Title VII's "because of' element as an explanation of one way
to prove this element. Placing the gross statistical disparity analysis within
the causation inquiry helps to better define why the requirement exists. Ap-
proaching the analysis in this way makes it more obvious that there may be
other ways to establish causation when the plaintiff alleges nonintentional
discrimination.222
Crafting general elements of a discrimination claim has many benefits. It
reinforces the idea that many of the types of discrimination and their at-
tendant frameworks are derived from the same statutory language. It allows
courts to use simpler inquiries to resolve many cases. It acknowledges that
there may be various ways to define a particular element, and it does so
without necessarily tying these options to a particular type of discrimina-
tion. Reliance on elements emphasizes the actual statutory language 223 and
places the language at a step in the analytical process where the language is
given primacy over tests.224
221. In re Morgan Stanley Info. Fund Sec. Litig., 592 F.3d 347, 359 (2d Cir. 2010) (dis-
cussing elements of statutory claim under the Securities Act); United States ex reL SNAPP,
Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 532 F.3d 496, 504-05 (6th Cir. 2008) (discussing elements of claim
under False Claims Act).
222. It is important to note that in the 1991 amendments to Title VII, Congress severely
limited the ways in which plaintiffs can prove a disparate impact claim under Title VII. Title
VII § 703(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k). This does not mean, however, that all nonintentional
discrimination claims are subsumed under the heading of disparate impact.
223. This is not the same as making a textualist argument. Rather, whatever statutory
interpretation methodology a court uses, the primacy of the language and its connection to any
resulting decision should be given more importance than they currently are.
224. To adopt a single set of elements, the courts would need to read the 1991 amend-
ments to Title VII as merely providing qualifying language to the statute's primary operative
provisions. In other words, the statutorily provided mixed-motive and disparate impact frame-
works would need to be read as falling within the umbrella of the statute's original text.
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Abandoning or diminishing the current typology makes it easier to see
that plaintiffs should be able to bring claims that fit within recognized cate-
gories of discrimination, but that do not fall neatly within any of the current
rubrics. It is also more apparent that hybrid claims should be viable in some
circumstances. For example, it may be easier for courts to recognize that
structural discrimination claims are cognizable under the statutes or that
plaintiffs should be able to proceed on intentional discrimination claims that
do not fit neatly within the harassment or McDonnell Douglas frameworks.
Further, a return to first principles will allow courts to more fully exam-
ine whether the current structures actually carry out the mandate of the
federal employment discrimination statutes. As described in Section IV.A,
the current reliance on frameworks means that courts often engage the
court-created test, rather than the statutory language.22
This proposal would also require courts to explore arguments that Title
VII prohibits negligent discrimination, unconscious discrimination, and
structural discrimination. This is not to state that the courts will actually
recognize such claims, but rather that these claims arguably fit within the
statutory language of Title VII-which does not explicitly require intent or
that discriminatory treatment spring from individual action. Under the cur-
rent approach, such claims are implicitly excluded from the statutes'
coverage because none of the current frameworks allow a plaintiff to estab-
lish these types of discrimination. Whether negligent, unconscious, or
structural discrimination claims are ultimately adopted, there is value in fa-
cially engaging whether the statutes prohibit such forms of discrimination.
Using the suggested approach does not mean that discrimination law no
longer requires definition by appellate courts or that answering these ques-
tions will be easy. Important questions still remain to be answered, such as
whether the "because of' language in the federal employment discrimina-
tion statutes would hold an employer liable for unconscious discrimination,
whether the employer can be liable for negligent actions, and how strict the
causal link is.226 And the courts may still have to make choices regarding the
elements themselves, such as whether accommodation or retaliation cases
require different elements than discrimination cases. Focusing less on
225. See supra Section IV.A; see also Diaz v. Jiten Hotel Mgmt., Inc., Civ. A
08CV10143-NG, 2011 WL 181777, at *11 (D. Mass. Jan. 20, 2011) (expressing concerns that
the frameworks and supporting doctrines do not fully capture complex discrimination inquir-
ies). Of course, abandoning or diminishing the use of frameworks will not prevent courts from
dismissing cases that are arguably cognizable, as courts can use other types of arguments to
reach similar conclusions. However, the approach advanced in this Article will make simple
cases easier, make some judges aware that the formalistic use of frameworks may cause the
unintentional dismissal of cognizable claims, and encourage courts to explicitly address ques-
tions regarding the contours of discrimination law.
226. See generally Mary Ellen Maatman, Choosing Words and Creating Worlds: The
Supreme Court's Rhetoric and its Constitutive Effects on Employment Discrimination Law, 60
U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1998) (discussing the Supreme Court's various approaches to causation
analysis in Title VII cases).
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frameworks will allow courts to concentrate more on these important ques-
tions.27
B. Questioning the Necessity of the Frameworks
Underlying the intuitive appeal of the current typology is the idea that
the typology was necessary to help lower courts decide employment dis-
crimination cases. A corollary to this idea is that without frameworks, the
lower courts will have great difficulty deciding discrimination cases. These
concerns are misplaced. The history of frameworks casts doubt on whether
they were even necessary in the first place. Further, there is nothing espe-
cially complex about employment discrimination law that suggests it should
work differently than other kinds of cases.
Much like reports of Mark Twain's death, the need for the frameworks
has been greatly exaggerated. In many cases, the Supreme Court has as-
sumed that lower courts are confused about employment discrimination law
and then resolved the nonexistent confusion by mandating that lower courts
think about discrimination problems through frameworks. The McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting test, the severe or pervasive test in harassment cas-
es, and parts of the disparate impact structure were all created before there
was a demonstrated need for them.
McDonnell Douglas offers a classic example of how appellate courts re-
solve nonexistent problems. The three-part framework is complicated in
both its substance and in its odd burden-shifting procedures. One might
think that a terrible confusion must have existed in the lower courts to justi-
fy the imposition of such a complex framework. But the district court in
McDonnell Douglas had no problems analyzing the case before it, which
involved an individual who alleged that his former employer refused to re-
hire him because of his race and his participation in civil rights protests.28
The employer claimed that it would not rehire the plaintiff because his pro-
tests, which included stalling cars on a public road outside the defendant's
business to prevent egress, were illegal. The trial court sensibly explained
one of the key factual inquiries as "whether the 'stall in' and the 'lock in'
are the real reasons for defendant's refusal to rehire the plaintiff."2 29 The
district court was able to make this determination without a complicated
framework.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals tried to impose a complex frame-
work that cast doubt on the validity of subjective decisionmaking.230 The
Supreme Court responded to the Eighth Circuit by tinkering with its com-
plicated framework rather than recognizing that perhaps there was no need
227. Even if courts choose not to abandon the frameworks, there is still value in having
them think more deeply about the role of frameworks. In some instances, the frameworks are
nonfunctional or, at worst, dysfunctional.
228. Green v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp., 318 F. Supp. 846 (E.D. Mo. 1970), modified,
463 F.2d 337 (8th Cir. 1972), vacated, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
229. Id. at 850.
230. Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 463 F.2d 337 (8th Cir. 1972).
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for the framework at all. Even if the Supreme Court thought the district
court was confused about the role of pretext in employment discrimination
cases, the creation of the multipart framework was not justified. The Court
simply could have held that evidence that the employer's reason for an ac-
tion is pretextual may be evidence of discriminatory motive. Instead, it
chose to create a multipart framework.
In Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, the Court was asked to deter-
mine whether disparate impact analysis could apply to subjective
employment practices.2 3 1 Holding that it did, the Court then anticipated that
its "extension of that theory into the context of subjective selection practices
could increase the risk that employers will be given incentives to adopt quo-
tas or to engage in preferential treatment. '23 2 The Court felt compelled to
resolve the anticipated problem by clarifying the disparate impact frame-
work. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals had held that subjective
decisionmaking could not be challenged through disparate impact analy-
sis, 23 3 and the Supreme Court could have responded to the Fifth Circuit's
holding by indicating that disparate impact analysis is appropriate for sub-
jective decisionmaking. It was not essential for the Supreme Court to
address proof structure issues.
Similarly, the Supreme Court engaged in problem anticipation in the
harassment context. In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, the Court addressed
whether harassment claims were actionable under Title VII if they did not
result in tangible, economic harm. 234 The Court indicated that harassment
would be actionable if it affected a term, condition, or privilege of employ-
ment.233 The Court could have ended its analysis there; however, it then
began to articulate a framework in which harassment must be "sufficiently
severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employ-
ment.' ",236 Likewise, in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., the Court could have
limited its holding to whether the plaintiff had to suffer psychological harm
to state a claim for sexual harassment.237 A broader, but still limited, holding
could have addressed this issue as well as the question of whether an objec-
tive standard would be used. 238 Rather than limiting itself to these primary
231. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988).
232. Id. at 993.
233. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 798 F.2d 791, 797 (5th Cir. 1986), vacated,
487 U.S. 977 (1988). The appellate court analyzed the individual plaintiff's claim as a dispar-
ate treatment claim. Id. at 797-98.
234. 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986).
235. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66.
236. Id. at 67 (alteration in original) (citing Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904
( lth Cir. 1982).
237. 510 U.S. 17, 20 (1993).
238. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22. In Harris, the petitioner's brief suggested criteria for
determining whether an individual's environment was hostile. This was not the main issue
raised in the case, however. Brief for Petitioner, Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17
(1993) (No. 92-1168), 1993 WL 302216, at *41. Nor was there any evidence that the lower
courts in the case had trouble with such an inquiry. The magistrate judge engaged in a
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questions, the Court articulated several factors that a court should consider
when thinking about how serious harassment is.239
It could be argued that the Supreme Court should resolve anticipated
problems to head off subsequent confusion among the lower courts. Howev-
er, the Supreme Court has often assumed such confusion where none
existed. Even assuming that some confusion would be generated by a lack
of guidance, the Supreme Court's frameworks have generated quite a few
problems on their own. Since 1971, the Supreme Court has repeatedly read-
dressed how its frameworks operate. 4° The federal appellate and district
courts are endlessly engaged in framework questions.141 It took decades for
the Court to explain the nuances of the McDonnell Douglas test. 42 Congress
felt compelled to rework the frameworks that the Court created for mixed-
motive and disparate impact cases. 243
Even if one believes that the frameworks were originally necessary,
however, this does not mean that they still are. In the early 1970s, it may
have been important for the courts to think about the ways discrimination
might happen and to give those ways names and frameworks. To the extent
that the formulations now have decreasing utility, their continued use be-
comes less compelling.
To impose so many frameworks is not only unusual, but also gives the
mistaken impression that employment discrimination cases are somehow
different or harder than other cases that judges handle. Indeed, the sheer
number of frameworks in employment discrimination law makes it rather
unique among statutory regimes. But the assumption that the frameworks
are needed is also belied by the fact that at least some of the frameworks are
broad-ranging inquiry regarding the work environment. Haris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., No. 3-89-
0557, 1991 WL 487444, at *5-8 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 4, 1991), aff'd, 976 F.2d 733 (6th Cir.
1992), rev'd, 510 U.S. 17 (1993). Further, there was no explanation in Harris why the court
chose to focus on the four factors that it did. The EEOC had identified more relevant factors in
describing whether conduct created a hostile environment, and the magistrate judge focused
on numerous factors. See Brief for Petitioner, supra, at *41 (describing EEOC factors); Har-
ris, 1991 WL 487444, at *5-8.
239. Harris, 501 U.S. at 23.
240. See, e.g., Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 554 U.S. 84, 91-95 (2008); De-
sert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98-101 (2003); O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers
Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 311-13 (1996); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507
(1993); Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
241. See, e.g., Jamie Darin Prenkert, Bizarro Statutory Stare Decisis, 28 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 217, 234 (2007) (describing the circuit split that developed regarding how
disparate impact claims would work in the ADEA context); Timothy M. Tymkovich, The
Problem with Pretext, 85 DENV. U. L. REv. 503, 506, 527 (2008) (describing how circuit splits
erupted over the interpretation of McDonnell Douglas).
242. See, e.g., Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. at 311-13; Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506-
07; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
243. See Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 94-95 (explaining the 1991 amendments to Title VII
for mixed motive under 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m) and 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)); Phillips v. Cohen,
400 F.3d 388, 397-98 (6th Cir. 2005) (discussing how the 1991 amendments affected dispar-
ate impact analysis under Title VII).
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abandoned at trial. When cases go to the jury, many of these complicated
framework issues are absent from jury instructions.244
In other fields, rigid rules are relaxed over time in favor of standards. In
the same vein, the rigid formality of the discrimination frameworks should
be relaxed.2 45 Indeed, the Supreme Court may have signaled a retreat from
its prior reliance on the types and frameworks. In Gross, the Supreme Court
refused to recognize a mixed-motive claim under the ADEA.24 6 While this
holding is problematic in several respects, the reasoning of the case suggests
that the Court was reluctant to continue down the path of creating a new
proof structure or modifying existing ones.2 47 In refusing to apply the Price
Waterhouse test to the ADEA, Justice Thomas noted that "[w]hatever the
deficiencies of Price Waterhouse in retrospect, it has become evident in the
years since that case was decided that its burden-shifting framework is diffi-
cult to apply."248 He continued, "[E]ven if Price Waterhouse was
doctrinally sound, the problems associated with its application have elimi-
nated any perceivable benefit to extending its framework to ADEA
claims." 249 Gross, despite its otherwise faulty analysis, may have one sav-
ing grace: it signals the Supreme Court's retreat from frameworks.
C. Addressing Concerns Regarding Political Will,
Consistency, Certainty, and Efficiency
Abolishing or significantly reducing the reach of the typology potential-
ly raises concerns about political will, consistency, certainty, and efficiency.
Each of these is an important value, and each must be considered and ad-
dressed.
The problems created by the typology could be viewed as the necessary
consequences of a lack of political will. After all, if Congress did not ap-
prove of the types and frameworks, it has the power to amend the federal
statutes. If Congress chooses not to amend the typology, it might be as-
sumed that it implicitly approves of them. This is an important critique, but
it ignores that the effects of the frameworks are not readily transparent. It is
difficult for courts and litigants, let alone Congress, to understand the typol-
ogy's side effects, such as underexplored discrimination theories and tests
that are sometimes mismatched to the way in which discrimination occurs.
This is especially true when many frameworks purport to allow more
244. E.g., Messina v. Kroblin Transp. Sys., Inc., 903 F.2d 1306, 1308 (10th Cir. 1990)
(indicating McDonnell Douglas framework is too complex for jury instructions).
245. This discussion is not part of the rule versus standards debate because the discrimi-
nation frameworks tend to be standards. However, this discussion is informed by that debate to
the extent that the type/framework model has rule-like tendencies. For further discussion of
how rules and standards change over time, see, for example, Pierre Schlag, Rules and Stand-
ards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 429 (1985).
246. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2351 (2009).
247. See id. at 2349.
248. Id. at 2352.
249. Id.; see also Katz, Gross Disunity, supra note 2, at 878.
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nuanced decisionmaking than the courts actually engage in."' Indeed, one
key reason for abandoning the typology is to make the courts' reasoning and
its impact more visible.25 1
A more valid critique is that Congress has embraced the frameworks
with their 1991 amendments to Title VII, including the codification of a dis-
parate impact framework. 252 It is correct that Congress inserted a three-part
disparate impact framework into Title VII in response to the Supreme
Court's decision in Wards Cove. But this decision does not translate into
widespread congressional acceptance of the typology.2 13 While it may have
been clear to Congress that the specific Wards Cove framework was flawed
and required attention, Congress did not engage in a searching disparate
impact inquiry when it amended Title VII.254 Rather, an anchoring effect
drove the process, in which the outcome was dictated by the starting posi-
tion-the test enunciated by the Supreme Court.
Even assuming that the 1991 amendments demonstrate congressional
approval of a three-part framework for disparate impact cases, this does not
support the broader argument that Congress approves of the current typolo-
gy. First, the 1991 amendments do not cut off further judicial inquiry into
ways in which substantive equality can be incorporated into Title VII or
provide the only method of proceeding when the plaintiff lacks evidence of
intent.255 Second, if one were to argue that the Title VII amendments evinced
broad support for the typology in the disparate impact context, it would at
least remains ambiguous what Congress intended for the ADEA and ADA,
which Congress did not amend.
More importantly, the 1991 amendments did not embrace a framework
mentality regarding disparate treatment. By adding language to make it clear
that so-called "mixed-motive" claims were cognizable, Congress did not use
the term "mixed motive" or enshrine a multifactor test into the statute. Ra-
250, See, e.g., O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 311-12 (1996)
(noting lower courts refused to make common sense changes to McDonnell Douglas's prima
facie case, despite knowing that test required adjustments to fit factual circumstances).
251. In Gross, the Supreme Court engaged in a non-test-based analysis of the ADEA,
holding that the ADEA's language required a plaintiff to establish but-for causation. 129 S. Ct.
2343. While Gross is rightfully criticized for many reasons, it at least provides a clear target
for congressional reaction. See Katz, Gross Disunity, supra note 2, at 880-84. In response to
Gross, legislators have proposed the Protecting Workers Against Discrimination Act, which
would clarify that the ADEA allows plaintiffs to proceed by establishing that age was a moti-
vating factor in an employment decision. See Protecting Older Workers Against
Discrimination Act, H.R. 3721, 111 th Cong. § 2(a)-(b) (2009).
252. See Pub. L. No. 102-166, sec. 105(a), § 703, 105 Stat. 1071, 1074 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2006)).
253. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 2, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071 (indi-
cating that the disparate impact amendments were a response to Wards Cove); H.R. REP. No.
102-40, pt. 1, at 17, 23-45 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 555, 561-83 (indicating
that congressional action was taken in response to proof structures).
254. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 2, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071; H.R.
REP. 102-40, pt. 1, at 17, 23-45 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 555, 561-83.
255. Title VII § 703(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2006).
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ther, Congress chose to broadly define the causation standard and then iden-
tify an affirmative defense.256 Likewise, when Congress amended Title VII's
remedies provision in 1991, it did not indicate that there were only two
types of discrimination claims (disparate impact and disparate treatment).
Rather, it provided only that certain kinds of damages would be allowed if
the plaintiff proved intent. This is not the same as dividing employment dis-
crimination cases into two types (intentional and disparate impact).
Consistency and certainty are also valid concerns. In a sense, the frame-
works do cabin judicial discretion and arguably create a kind of factual
uniformity regarding what constitutes discrimination. Likewise, the typolo-
gy provides employers with some notion regarding when liability will
attach.
The numerous sources of confusion regarding framework technicalities
reduce the consistency that the frameworks offer.257 Even without the circuit
splits, though, the supposed consistency promised by frameworks comes at
the costs discussed throughout this Article. To the extent that some of the
frameworks actually direct courts away from asking whether a person was
treated differently because of a protected trait, a consistency argument is
less compelling. Just because a test is consistent does not mean that it is
consistently producing proper results.
The consistency and certainty arguments are more compelling regarding
court-identified types of discrimination. At some level, they do provide a
concrete way for courts to conceptualize discrimination. The benefits of la-
beling are not in dispute. What is disputed are the assumptions that
accompany those labels regarding the completeness and separateness of the
frameworks.
Finally, it is necessary to discuss efficiency concerns. In individual dis-
parate treatment law, where the interactions of the various frameworks are
complex, it is not clear that the frameworks meaningfully aid the courts in
resolving discrimination claims. Indeed, abolishing the McDonnell Douglas
256. Id. § 703(m), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) ("Except as otherwise provided in this sub-
chapter, an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party
demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any
employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice."); id.
§ 706(g)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (explaining the remedies that would available if
employer established affirmative defense).
257. See supra Section L.A (describing Supreme Court resolution of numerous issues);
Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 554 U.S. 84 (2008); Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539
U.S. 90, 98-101 (2003); O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 311-13
(1996); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507 (1993); Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs
v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981); Noviello v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d 76, 89 (Ist Cir.
2005) (noting circuit split regarding whether a hostile environment can comprise a retaliatory
adverse action); Seitz v. Lane Furniture Indus., Inc., No. 07CV171, 2008 WL 4346439, at *11
(N.D. Ohio Sept. 17, 2008) (noting a circuit split regarding whether motivating factor cases
can proceed under ADA); Raffaele v. City of New York, No. 00-CV-3837 (DGT)(RLM), 2004
WL 1969869, at *19 n.27 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2004) (indicating that there is a circuit split re-
garding what constitutes an adverse employment action); Gaston v. Restaurant Co., 260 F.
Supp. 2d 742, 752 (N.D. Iowa 2003) (noting a circuit split regarding whether reverse discrim-
ination plaintiffs are required to show additional evidence).
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test while preserving only its core holding will likely make it easier for
courts to determine whether a claim should survive summary judgment.258
Clarifying that mixed-motive and single-motive cases do not require sepa-
rate proof structures will also reduce many questions that now plague
courts.
Further, this Article's solution does not contemplate open-ended chaos
in employment discrimination law. Indeed, the majority of cases will still
likely fall within the currently delineated types, even if the negative effects
of a framework model are avoided by giving the typology less sway. It is
contemplated that over time, new ideas about discrimination will be ex-
plored. Not every factual allegation of discrimination will comport with
these new arguments, not all of the new arguments will be accepted, and the
changes in the field are likely to happen incrementally over time.
Outside of traditional disparate treatment cases, courts will be required
to rigorously consider new arguments about discrimination, which is less
efficient from a court-resources standpoint than implicitly rejecting new
arguments because they do not fall within the current frameworks. But it is
important not to overstate the efficiency problem by making sweeping gen-
eralizations about the floodgates of litigation. As discussed earlier, there are
only certain sets of facts from which a discrimination claim can plausibly be
made. Further, the mandatory administrative process and the short limita-
tions period already cabin employment discrimination claims.259 This Article
posits that any losses in court efficiency are worth the benefits derived from
more explicit consideration of the employment discrimination statutes.
CONCLUSION
In some ways, the framework model is comforting because it gives the
appearance that the courts are following an orderly and rational way of mak-
ing decisions about employment discrimination. Unfortunately, employment
discrimination law is held captive by this increasingly complicated web of
frameworks, which facilitate a reflexive, formalistic view of discrimination.
Rather than asking whether a particular set of facts establishes discrimina-
tion under the statutory scheme, courts and litigants now ask whether the
facts fit within a court-defined structure. Judges considering discrimination
claims use narrow frameworks through which to view the discrimination
inquiry. If a case does not fit comfortably within a recognized structure, it
likely will be dismissed.
258. It is also necessary to address critiques centered in legal realism or from critical
legal studies that judges will simply retool the law in line with their own personal or class
preferences, whether intentionally or unintentionally. While this may be true in certain in-
stances, the critique applies to almost any attempt at statutory interpretation or construction.
259. Title VII § 706(e)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(l) (indicating that a charge of dis-
crimination must be filed within 180 or 300 days of discriminatory act in Title VII case); id.
§ 706(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (noting that suit must be filed within ninety days of
obtaining right to sue letter).
[Vol. 110:69
Rethinking Discrimination Law
The frameworks presume that appellate judges both know how discrimi-
nation manifests itself in the workplace and can summarize those
manifestations into multipart tests. Such an assumption vastly underesti-
mates the complexity of discrimination, which stems from a variety of
motivations and presents itself in countless ways.2 60 Over time, the dominant
forms of discrimination have changed from overtly discriminatory policies
to more subtle forms of discrimination. The inflexibility of the framework
model makes it unable to account for the full manifestations of discrimina-
tion and stunts the evolution of discrimination law.
The Article has considered the ways in which the framework model dis-
torts discrimination law and suggests ways to eliminate or diminish that
distortion. In the 1970s, Professor Charles Lawrence argued that much dis-
crimination is unintentional.26' It is now time to question whether its
structural contours are as well.
260. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, General Essay, Implicit Bias, "Science," and Antidis-
crimination Law, 1 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 477, 477 (2007) (discussing various reasons
people may have negative race-based perceptions that do not relate to personal prejudice).
261. Lawrence, supra note 80, at 322.
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